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Network Neutrality, Consumers,
and Innovationt
Christopher S. Yoot
INTRODUCTION
Network neutrality remains one of the most controversial is-
sues in internet policy. It represented the most hotly contested
issue during the 2006 congressional debates over comprehensive
telecommunications reform legislation.1 It played a starring role
in the clearance of the series of megamergers that has recently
transformed the telecommunications industry.2 It has been the
subject of hearings and a report issued by the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC").3 And it is the subject of pending legislation
t Copyright © 2008 Christopher Yoo.
t Professor of Law and Communication and Founding Director of the Center for
Technology, Innovation, and Competition, University of Pennsylvania. Portions of this
Article were incorporated into my testimony at the Public Hearing on Broadband Net-
work Management Practices held before the Federal Communications Commission on
February 25, 2008; the Hearing on Net Neutrality and Free Speech on the Internet held
before the Task Force on Competition Policy and Antitrust Laws of the House Judiciary
Committee on March 11, 2008; and the Hearing on H.R. 5353: The Internet Freedom
Preservation Act of 2008 held before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the
Internet of the House Commerce Committee on May 6, 2008.
1 See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94
Georgetown L J 1847, 1858-60 (2006) (reviewing the 2006 congressional debate over
network neutrality).
2 See AT&T Inc and BellSouth Corp Application for Transfer of Control, Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order, 22 FCC Rec 5662, 5724-27 77 116-20 & n 339, 5738-39 7 151-
53 (2007) (finding a lack of evidence that network owners are likely to block, degrade, or
otherwise discriminate against internet content, services, applications, or service provid-
ers); Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses,
Adelphia Communications Corporation, Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc, Assignees,
et al, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 FCC Rec 8203, 8296-99 7 217-23 (2006)
(same); Verizon Communications, Inc and MCI, Inc Applications for Approval of Transfer
of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rec 18433, 18507-09 IT 139-43
(2005) (same); SBC Communications, Inc and AT&T Corp Applications for Approval of
Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rec 18290, 18366-68
140-44 (2005) (same).
3 See Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report on Broadband Connectivity Competi-
tion Policy 10, 11 (June 2007), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/reportslbroadband
v070000report.pdf> (last visited Mar 6, 2008) (recommending "that policy makers proceed
with caution in evaluating proposals to enact regulation in the area of broadband Inter-
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and hearings before the current Congress, 4 as well as a pending
Notice of Inquiry 5 and a recent complaint before the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC").6
The multiplicity of positions taken by various advocates
makes it hard to define network neutrality with any precision. 7
Perhaps the easiest definition is the one offered in an op-ed au-
thored by Lawrence Lessig and Robert McChesney, who state
that "[n]et neutrality means simply that all like internet content
must be treated alike and move at the same speed over the net-
work."'8 Some network neutrality proponents oppose "consumer
tiering," in which network providers charge end users higher
amounts for more bandwidth or faster internet service.9 Others
net access" and that "[p]olicy makers ... carefully consider the potentially adverse and
unintended effects of regulation in the area of broadband Internet access before enacting
any such regulation" and noting that the Commission was "unaware of any significant
market failure or demonstrated consumer harm from conduct by broadband providers").
4 See HR 5994, 10th Cong, 2d Sess (May 8, 2008), in 154 Cong Rec H 3402 (May 8,
2008); HR 5353, 110th Cong, 2d Sess (Feb 12, 2008), in 154 Cong Rec H 869 (Feb 12,
2008); S 215, 110th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 9, 2007), in 153 Cong Rec S 287 (Jan 9, 2007); The
Future of the Internet: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science &
Transportation, 110th Cong (2006); The Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2008. Hear-
ing on H.R. 5353 Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong (2008); Net Neutrality and Free Speech
on the Internet: Hearing Before the Task Force on Competition Policy and Antitrust Laws,
House Committee on the Judiciary, 110th Cong (2008).
5 Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Inquiry, 22 FCC Rec 7894 (2007).
6 Comment Sought on Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding Internet Manage-
ment Policies, Public Notice, 23 FCC Rec 340 (2008) (seeking comment on complaint that
degradation of peer-to-peer traffic violates the FCC's 2005 Internet Policy Statement and
does not constitute reasonable traffic management).
7 Eli Noam has identified no fewer than seven versions of network neutrality. See
Eli Noam, A Third Way for Net Neutrality, Fin Times-FT.com (Aug 29, 2006), available at
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/acfl4410-3776-lldb-bcOl-0000779e2340.html> (last visited
Mar 6, 2008).
8 Lawrence Lessig and Robert W. McChesney, No Tolls on the Internet, Wash Post
A23 (June 8, 2006).
9 See, for example, Marvin Ammori, Time Warner Goes Back to the Future (Jan 17
2008), available at <http://www.savetheinternet.comfblog/2008/01/25/back-to-the-future-
time-warner-broadband-plan-recalls-aols-walled-gardenl> (last visited Apr 19, 2008)
(arguing that charging customers for using more bandwidth raises network neutrality
issues); Fred von Lohmann, Time Warner Puts a Meter on the Internet, Electronic Fron-
tier Foundation (Jan 22, 2008), available at <http://www.eff.org/deeplinks2008/01/time-
warners-puts-meter-internet> (last visited Apr 19, 2008) (arguing that consumer tiering
suffers from "serious potential drawbacks"); Save the Internet Blog, Time Warner Metered
Pricing: Not the Solution (Jan 17, 2008), available at <http://www.savetheinternet.coml
blogI2008/01/17/time-warner%e2%80%99s-metered-pricing-not-the-solution> (last visited
Apr 19, 2008) (quoting network neutrality advocate Ben Scott as arguing that metered
pricing may chill innovation); Catherine Holahan, Time Warner's Pricing Paradox: Pro-
posed Changes in the Cable Provider's Fees for Web Could Crimp Demand for Download
Services and Hurt Net Innovation, BusinessWeek (Jan 18, 2008), available at
<http:l/www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jan2008/tc20080118598544.htm>
(last visited Apr 19, 2008) (summarizing network neutrality proponents' arguments
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restrict their objections to "access tiering," which Lessig defines
as "any policy by network owners to condition content or service
providers' right to provide content or service to the network upon
the payment of some fee" in addition to basic internet access
fees. 10 Or as Lessig and McChesney more colorfully put it in
their op-ed, network providers should not be allowed "to sell ac-
cess to the express lane to deep-pocketed corporations and rele-
gate everyone else to the digital equivalent of a winding dirt
road."1 1
Network neutrality proponents advocate categorical, ex ante
prohibitions on discrimination against particular content or ap-
plications. 12 These positions are primarily based on two ration-
ales: First, network neutrality proponents argue that permitting
network providers to institute such practices would harm con-
sumers by preventing them from freely accessing whatever con-
tent and applications they may choose, or attaching to the net-
work whatever equipment they may wish. 13 Second, they argue
that such practices would harm innovation in content, applica-
tions, and equipment. 14 They support their arguments by identi-
against metered pricing).
10 Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science &
Transportation, 109th Cong 2 & n 2, 8-10 (2006) (statement of Prof. Lawrence Lessig),
available at <http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/essig-020706.pdf> (last visited Mar 6,
2008).
11 Lessig and McChesney, No Tolls, Wash Post at A23 (cited in note 8).
12 See, for example, Brett Frischmann and Barbara van Schewick, Net Neutrality and
the Economics of the Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 Jurimetrics
J at 383, 387-88 (2007) (noting that network neutrality proponents "contend that the
threat of discrimination will reduce unaffiliated application and content developers' in-
centives to innovate'); Lessig testimony 8-9 (cited in note 10) (arguing that access tiering
represents a threat to innovation in internet applications and content); Network Neutral-
ity: Competition, Innovation and Nondiscriminatory Access, Hearing Before the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong 4-5 (2006), available at <http://www.judiciary.
house.gov/media/pdfs/wu042506.pdf> (arguing that deviations from network neutrality
represent a threat to innovation on the internet).
13 See, for example, Common Cause, Keep the Internet Free and Open!, available at
<http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNKlMQIwG&b=1234951> (last visited
Apr 10, 2008) (arguing that network providers can restricting consumers' ability to access
content and applications); John Windhausen, Jr., Good Fences Make Bad Broadband:
Preserving an Open Internet Through Net Neutrality: A Public Knowledge White Paper
(Feb 6, 2006), available at <http://static.publicknowledge.org/pdf/pk-net-neutrality-
whitep-20060206.pdf> (last visited Mar 6, 2008) (arguing that broadband network pro-
viders can restrict consumers' ability to attach equipment, access websites, or run appli-
cations as they see fit).
14 See, for example, Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas 156, 162, 168, 171, 175
(Vintage 2001) ("A closed network creates an externality on innovation generally. It in-
creases the cost of innovation by increasing the range of actors that must license any new
innovation."); Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate, A User's Guide, 3 J on Telecommun &
High Tech L 69, 72-74, 85-88 (2004) (arguing that network neutrality is necessary to
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
fying circumstances under which deviations from network neu-
trality can hurt consumers. 15
This article more directly engages claims that mandating
network neutrality is essential to protecting consumers and in-
novation. My analysis shows that the types of prioritized service
and access tiering that network neutrality proponents would for-
bid may actually benefit consumers and promote innovation. It
draws on two sources of insight that have often been overlooked
in the network neutrality debate. The first is the academic litera-
ture on the economics of regulation. In particular, I expand upon
my prior work emphasizing supply-side considerations, such as
the economics of congestion and product differentiation, to dis-
cuss the implications of demand-side considerations, such as
Ramsey pricing and two-sided markets. Interestingly, these
analyses suggest that prohibiting network providers from charg-
ing different prices to different content and application providers
can harm consumers by forcing them to pay a larger proportion
of the fixed costs of upgrading the network. In addition, mandat-
ing nondiscriminatory access threatens to favor content and ap-
plications optimized for the network as it exists today over con-
tent and applications that depend on a different network archi-
tecture. Indeed, preventing network providers from prioritizing
certain content or applications over others may reduce innova-
tion by making it more difficult for those innovations that de-
pend on guaranteed quality of service from emerging.
The second source is the empirical evidence about the likely
impact of attempting to regulate the terms and conditions of
internet access. In this regard, my analysis is informed in part by
the lessons from previous attempts to regulate access to commu-
nications. It also takes into account the FCC's determination on
five separate occasions over the past two and a half years that
there was insufficient evidence of degradation and blocking to
justify regulatory intervention, 16 a conclusion echoed by the
OECD, 17 Justice Department,' 8 and FTC,' 9 as well as the fact
preserve an "innovation commons").
15 See, for example, Frischmann and van Schewick, 47 Jurimetrics J at 412-16 (cited
in note 12); Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neu-
trality Regulation, 5 J on Telecommun & High Tech L 329, 342-52 (2007).
16 See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rec 14853,
14904 96 (2005), and sources cited in note 2.
17 OECD Report, Internet Traffic Prioritisation: An Overview 5 (Apr. 6, 2007), avail-
able at <http://www.oecd.orgtdataoecd//43/63/38405781.pdf> (last visited May 9, 2008).
18 Ex parte Filing of the Department of Justice, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Sept. 6, 2007),
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that the ongoing Notice of Inquiry on Broadband Industry Prac-
tices 20 has identified only a handful of isolated instances. My po-
sition is also informed by the growing empirical literature show-
ing how coordination of content and conduit through vertical in-
tegration or contractual exclusivity generally benefits consum-
ers 2' as well as the empirical literature showing how mandating
access has deterred investments in new broadband networks. 22
I also show how the arguments advanced by some network
neutrality proponents confuse the role of what economist Frank-
lin Fisher has called "exemplifying theory" and "generalizing
theory" in analyzing public policy. 23 Generalizing theory relies on
fairly general assumptions to establish broad propositions that
apply under a wide range of circumstances. Exemplifying theory,
in contrast, employs specialized assumptions to show what can
happen under particular circumstances. 24 The specificity of ex-
emplifying theory can play an important role in isolating the ef-
fect of particular economic considerations or in serving as possi-
bility theorems demonstrating the potential existence of particu-
lar phenomena. As such, exemplifying theory is very helpful in
rebutting calls for categorical rules.
For example, my own work has traced how the Chicago
School was able to use exemplifying theory to build a powerful
case against treating vertical restraints on trade as per se ille-
gal. 25 Subsequent attempts by Chicago School theorists to ex-
available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/publiccomments/225767.pdf> (last visited May 9,
2008).
19 See Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report on Broadband Connectivity Competi-
tion Policy (cited in note 3).
20 See Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Inquiry, 22 FCC Rec 7894 (2007).
21 See Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and
the Internet: The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 Colum L Rev 1822, 1846-47 (2007) (discuss-
ing surveys of the empirical literature showing that vertical restraints tend to enhanced
economic welfare and benefit consumers).
22 See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 Harv J L & Tech 1, 52 n
199 (collecting empirical studies concluding that mandated sharing deterred investment
in new broadband networks).
23 Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND J
Econ 113, 117 (1989).
24 Id at 117-18.
25 Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Econ-
omy, 19 Yale J Reg 171, 187-200 (2002). One could argue with considerable force that the
Chicago School critique represents a form of generalizing theory. That said, the Chicago
School theory of vertical exclusion acknowledged the existence of a number of exceptions
(including variable proportions and evasion of rate regulation) in which vertical re-
straints may be both profitable and anticompetitive. Resolving whether the incorporation
of these exceptions represents a sufficient departure from generalizing theory to render
this critique exemplifying theory is not essential for the argument advanced here. At a
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pand these theories into a basis for establishing a categorical
rule in the other direction under which vertical restraints would
be per se legal 26 prompted a series of influential post-Chicago
analyses showing the existence of circumstances under which
monopoly leveraging is both profitable and inefficient, again ef-
fectively rebutting calls for broad categorical rules. 27
Another example of exemplifying theory is showing how dif-
ferent institutional arrangements can lower transaction costs.
Transaction cost theories are often criticized for being all too
easy to state, yet all but impossible to verify or falsify empiri-
cally. 28 Although there is a burgeoning empirical literature on
transaction costs, 29 until more general patterns emerge, transac-
tion cost analyses are unlikely to yield the broad policy infer-
ences that characterize generalizing theory. They nonetheless
remain useful in providing counterexamples that can rebut
claims that a particular practice inevitably has a particular eco-
nomic effect.
At the same time, the stylized nature of the assumptions on
which exemplifying theories tend to be based limit them to iden-
tifying what can happen and prevent them from providing any
insight into the likelihood that the effects they identify will actu-
minimum, the theories advanced by the Chicago School were sufficiently exemplifying to
rebut the then-current doctrine treating many vertical restraints as illegal per se.
26 See Robert Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 75 Yale L J 373, 397 (1966) ('The thesis advanced here is that every
vertical arrangement should be lawful."); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Anti-
trust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U Chi L Rev 6, 22-25
(1981) ("I now think that it would be best to declare that purely vertical restraints on
intrabrand competition ... are legal per se.'). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical
Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 Antitrust L J 135, 135 (1984) ("No practice a
manufacturer uses to distribute its products should be a subject of serious antitrust at-
tention.").
27 Yoo, 19 Yale J Reg at 202-03 (cited in note 25) (reviewing the post-Chicago litera-
ture rebutting Chicago School calls for per se legality of all vertical restraints).
28 See, for example, Robert A. Pollak, A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and
Households, 23 J Econ Lit 581, 584, n 9 (1985) ("Critics of the transaction cost approach
often object that its difficult or impossible to test, refute, or falsify, claiming that it ex-
plains everything and, therefore, explains nothing."); Stanley Fischer, Long-Term Con-
tracting, Sticky Prices, and Monetary Policy: Comment, 3 J Monetary Econ 317, 322 n 5
(1977) ('Transaction costs have a well-deserved bad name as a theoretical device ... [in
part] because there is a suspicion that almost anything can be rationalized by invoking
suitably specified transaction costs.").
29 For early surveys of the empirical literature on transaction costs, see Howard A.
Shelanski and Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A
Review and Assessment, 11 J L Econ & Org 334 (1995); and Aric Rindfleisch and Jan B.
Heide, Transaction Cost Analysis: Past, Present, and Future Applications, 61 J Marketing
30 (1997). For a more recent survey, see Jeffrey T. Macher and Barak D. Richman,
Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences
10 Bus & Pol 1 (2008).
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ally come to pass.30 Absent empirical support, exemplifying the-
ory cannot provide the broad policy inferences needed to support
ex ante categorical prohibitions. 31 In other words, the mere fact
that a particular practice may be harmful under certain circum-
stances does not justify banning that practice categorically.
Thus, anyone advocating broad, ex ante prohibitions of the type
advocated by network neutrality proponents bears the burden of
adducing empirical evidence showing that the conduct they
would like to prohibit tends to harm consumers in the vast ma-
jority of cases. 32 Failing that, proponents must at least offer a
generalizing theory indicating that the harm is sufficiently likely
to justify broad-scale remediation and that the proposed regula-
tory solution addresses that harm without simultaneously pro-
scribing behavior that is potentially beneficial to consumers. 33
The distinction between generalizing and exemplifying the-
ory simultaneously helps frame the arguments I have advanced
in the network neutrality debate and illustrate the shortcomings
of the arguments advanced by my critics. My previous work has
focused on rebutting calls for imposing categorical, ex ante rules
mandating network neutrality by analyzing how deviating from
network neutrality can yield consumer benefits by mitigating the
sources of market failure that plague the telecommunications
industry34 and by enhancing network providers' ability to man-
age the mounting problems of congestion. 35
30 Fisher, 20 RAND J Econ at 118 (cited in note 23) ("Exemplifying theory does not
tell us what must happen. Rather it tells us what can happen.").
31 See, for example, Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics:
Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U Pa L Rev 1, 89 (1997) ('Per se rules cannot be
established by exemplifying theories.").
32 See, for example, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, 127 S Ct
2705, 2712 (2007) ("[Tthe per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had consider-
able experience with the type of restraint at issue and only if courts can predict with
confidence that it would be invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule of
reason.").
33 See, for example, Northern Pacific Railway Co v United States, 356 US 1, 5 (1958)
(holding that per se illegality should be limited to practices that exhibit such a "perni-
cious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue" that nothing would be lost if
it were presumed to be illegal "without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use').
34 See Yoo, 19 Harv J L & Tech at 18-53 (cited in note 22) (describing how allowing
network owners to diversify their networks can allow multiple networks to survive de-
spite the supply-side and demand-side scale economies that tend to drive markets for
telecommunications services toward natural monopoly); Christopher S. Yoo, Would Man-
dating Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Broadband Competition?: A Comment on the
End-to-End Debate, 3 J on Telecommun & High Tech L 23, 54-65 (2004) (showing how
preventing network owners from varying their services forces them to complete solely on
price and network size, which reinforces the benefits enjoyed by the largest players and
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At the same time, I have never advanced the claim that de-
viations from network neutrality are always beneficial. Indeed,
the exemplifying theories I have offered are by their very nature
analytically incapable of supporting such a claim. It is for this
reason that I have consistently rejected categorical approaches
pushing in either direction in favor of a case-by-case approach
that requires a clear showing of harm to competition, or consum-
ers, before imposing liability. 36 My work has explicitly pointed to
the FCC's prompt action in the Madison River case 37 as sugges-
tive of the type of regime I have in mind. 38
My work is more fairly characterized as an attempt to strike
a middle ground that protects consumers while also giving the
broadband industry the flexibility it needs to experiment with
new ways to meet the increasingly varied and intense demands
that consumers are placing on the network. The moderateness of
my proposal is underscored by the confusion that has arisen over
how to characterize my position. Some scholars have focused on
the fact that I favor some level of intervention and called me a
proponent of network neutrality regulation. 39 Others have fo-
cused on the fact that I oppose ex ante, categorical intervention
and characterized my position as deregulationist. 40
At the same time, the distinction between generalizing and
exemplifying theory underscores key weaknesses in the argu-
thus can become the source of, rather than the solution to, market failure).
35 See Yoo, 94 Georgetown L J at 1863-1900 (cited in note 1) (analyzing how devia-
tions from the current regime of network pricing can reduce congestion to more efficient
levels).
36 See Yoo, 19 Harv J L & Tech at 7-8, 24, 75 (cited in note 22) (arguing in favor of a
case-by-case approach); Yoo, 94 Georgetown L J at 1854-55, 1900, 1908 (cited in note 1)
(same); Yoo, 3 J on Telecommun & High Tech L at 44-47, 58-59 (cited in note 34) (same).
37 Madison River Communications, LLC, Order, 20 FCC Rec 4295 (2005).
38 See Yoo, 19 Harv J L & Tech at 67 (cited in note 22) (pointing to Madison River as
an example of a case-by-case approach to network neutrality); Yoo, 94 Georgetown L J at
1855, 1900 (cited in note 1) (same).
39 See, for example, Mark A. Jamison and Janice A. Hauge, Getting What You Pay
for: Analyzing the Net Neutrality Debate 1 (Aug 16, 2007), available at
<http://ssrn.comlabstract=1081690> (last visited June 12, 2008); Douglas A. Hass, Com-
ment, The Never-Was-Neutral Net and Why Informed End Users Can End the Net Neu-
trality Debates, 22 Berkeley Tech L J 1565, 1569, 1593 (2007).
40 See, for example, Scott Jordan, A Layered Network Approach to Net Neutrality, 1
Int'l J Comm 427, 429 (2007), available at <http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/
view/168/88> (last visited June 12, 2008) (referring to me as a "[d]eregulationist" who
"believe[s] that ISPs are in the best position to determine the most beneficial evolution of
the Internet"); Frischmann and van Schewick, 47 Jurimetrics J at 390, 397 (cited in note
12) (claiming that I am arguing in favor of "leav[ing] it to network owners to decide how
best to manage congestion on their networks, and rest assured that they will do what is
sensible from a social perspective").
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ments advanced by network neutrality proponents to date. It is
insufficient for network neutrality proponents to offer theoretical
counter-examples of instances in which mandating network neu-
trality might be beneficial. The burden remains on those advo-
cating network neutrality not just to offer exemplifying theory,
but rather to offer the type of generalizing theory and empirical
support necessary to support the type of sweeping, ex ante, cate-
gorical prohibitions that they have in mind. In the absence of
such empirical support, the impact on consumers is ultimately
ambiguous. In the face of theoretical ambiguity and in the ab-
sence of any evidence of harm to consumers, there is no justifica-
tion for prohibiting any particular practices ex ante. The more
appropriate course would be to adopt a regulatory regime that
permits experimentation with different practices, but stands
ready to intervene should evidence of such consumer harm
emerge. Moreover, the empirical literature suggests that vertical
integration or exclusivity arrangements between content and
conduit are more likely to benefit consumers than harm them.
I. THE FORCES DRWING THE NETWORK NEUTRALITY DEBATE
A number of technological developments and considerations
have added new dimensions to the debate over network neutral-
ity. The emergence of internet video is raising the prospect of a
dramatic increase in the growth rate of internet traffic. The
growing importance of peer-to-peer technologies also raises sig-
nificant policy implications. Network providers are also inter-
connecting in ways and entering into business relationships that
are increasingly diverse. Lastly, the controversy surrounding
Comcast's treatment of BitTorrent traffic is forcing policymakers
to confront variations in the ways that congestion impacts differ-
ent transmission technologies.
A. The Emergence of Internet Video
Although some industry leaders have occasionally offered
somewhat hyperbolic statements about the rate at which inter-
net traffic is expanding, 41 in recent years, internet traffic ap-
pears to have settled into a pattern of rapid, but reasonably sta-
41 Univ of Minn Digital Tech Ctr, Minnesota Internet Traffic Studies (Aug 30, 2007),
available at <http://www.dtc.umn.edu/mints/home.html> (last visited June 12, 2008)
(collecting claims that internet traffic is growing at rates of between 100 percent and 500
percent each year).
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ble growth. After growing at a rate of 100 percent per year from
the early 1990s until about 2002 (not including the ten-fold in-
crease in traffic between 1995 and 1996), internet growth has
stabilized at an annual rate of roughly 50-60 percent. 42
At the same time, reports have begun to appear predicting
that the widescale deployment of internet video technologies will
cause traffic growth to approach pre-2002 levels. 43 Some esti-
mate that YouTube traffic already constitutes 10 percent of all
internet traffic.44 Other video-based technologies, such as inter-
net distribution of movies (currently being deployed by Netflix),
graphics-intensive online games (such as World of Warcraft) and
virtual worlds (such as Second Life), and internet protocol televi-
sion ("IPTV") (currently being deployed by AT&T) are emerging
as well. 45 The ongoing transition of high definition television is
likely to cause demand to increase still further.46 Thus, some in-
dustry observers predict that video traffic will constitute over 80
percent of all internet traffic by 2010. 47 An oft-cited study by
Nemertes Research predicts that video will cause the rate of traf-
fic growth to accelerate beyond the current pace of investment in
new network capacity. This means that traffic growth will ex-
haust the usable network capacity by 2010 unless the world in-
creases its rate of capital expenditures on upgrading the network
infrastructure by over $100 billion. 48 Even network neutrality
42 Univ of Minn Digital Tech Ctr, Internet Growth Trends and Moore's Law (Aug 30,
2007), available at <http://www.dtc.umn.edu/mints/igrowth.html> (last visited June 12,
2008). See also Cisco Systems, Global IP Traffic Forecast and Methodology, 2006-2011, at
1 (White Paper Jan 14, 2008), available at <http://www.cisco.com/enIUS/solutions/
collateral/ns341/ns525/ns537/net -implementation-white-paper090aecd8O6a8laa.pdf>
(last visited June 12, 2008) (predicting that internet traffic will grow at a 46 percent
annual rate between 2007 and 2011).
43 Bret Swanson and George Gilder, Estimating the Exaflood: The Impact of Video
and Rich Media on the Internet 22 (Jan 2008), available at <http://www.discovery.org/
scripts/viewDB/filesDB-download.php?command=download&id=1475> (last visited June
12, 2008) (estimating that internet traffic growth might grow at an annual rate of 90
percent until 2015).
44 See Ellacoya Networks, Inc, Press Release, Ellacoya Data Shows Web Traffic Over-
takes Peer-to-Peer (P2P) as Largest Percentage of Bandwidth on the Network (June 18,
2007), available at <http://www.ellacoya.com/news/pdf/2007/NXTcommEllacoyamedia
alert.pdf> (last visited June 12, 2008).
45 See Swanson and Gilder, Estimating the Exaflood, at 12-14 (cited in note 43).
46 See Bret Swanson, The Coming Exaflood, Wall St J All (Feb 20, 2007).
47 See William B. Norton, Video Internet: The Next Wave of Massive Disruption to the
U.S. Peering Ecosystem (vO.91) at 2 (Sept 29, 2006), available at <http://www-
tc.pbs.orgtcringelypulpit/media/internetVideo0.9l.pd' (last visited June 12, 2008).
48 See Nemertes Research, The Internet Singularity, Delayed: Why Limits in Internet
Capacity Will Stifle Innovation on the Web 31, 45 (Fall 2007), available at
<http://www.nemertes.com/system/iles/internet+Singularity+Delayed+Fall+2007.pdf>
(last visited June 12, 2008).
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proponents, such as Google and EDUCAUSE, have warned that
the internet will struggle to accommodate consumers' increasing
demands for bandwidth. 49
To date, there are no signs that this so-called "exaflood"50
has begun to materialize. The conflicting reports about the possi-
ble acceleration in the rate of internet traffic pose a dilemma for
network providers, who must begin plans to expand capacity well
in advance of any increase in demand. If they follow the higher
estimates, they may end up investing tens of billions of dollars in
unnecessary network capacity. Following such an approach
would slow national broadband deployment in higher-cost areas
by taking up scarce capital and by increasing the number of cus-
tomers needed for broadband service to break even in any par-
ticular area. If they follow the lower estimates, they risk seeing
congestion cause their networks to slow to a crawl.
Furthermore, although the increase in traffic is an impor-
tant development, as I have detailed in my previous work, con-
gestion is a complex phenomenon that depends on more than just
total volume. 51 As I shall discuss in greater detail below, it also
depends on the timing, location, and pattern of overall network
traffic. In addition, networks' ability to compensate for increases
in demand by rerouting traffic can make network performance
quite unpredictable. Thus, a disruption in one portion of the
network can increase congestion in areas of the network located
far from the point of disruption.
The uncertainty over the rate and location of traffic growth
has placed greater importance on network management. Specifi-
cally, network management represents an important alternative
to expanding capacity that serves as a safety valve to relieve
network congestion when expanding capacity is not an option. In
49 See Internet Not Designed for TV, Google Warns, PC Mag (Feb 8, 2007) (quoting
Google head of TV technology Vincent Dureau as stating at the Cable Europe Congress,
'The web infrastructure and even Google's doesn't scale. It's not going to offer the quality
of service that consumers expect.'); John Windhausen Jr., A Blueprint for Big Broadband
7-11 (EDUCAUSE White Paper Jan 2008) (also quoting studies by Jupiter Research and
Technology Futures), available at <http://www.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/EPO080l.pdf>
(last visited June 12, 2008).
50 The term, "exaflood," to describe the prospect of a video-driven acceleration in the
growth rate of internet traffic appears to have been coined initially by Bret Swanson and
George Gilder. Bret Swanson, The Coming Exaflood, Wall St J All (Feb 20, 2007); Bret
Swanson and George Gilder, Unleashing the "Exaflood", Wall St J A15 (Feb 22, 2008). See
also Bruce Mehlman and Larry Irving, Bring on the Exaflood!: Broadband Needs a Boost,
Wash Post A31 (May 24, 2007).
51 See Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks as
Complex Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 Nw U L Rev 1687 (2005).
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this sense, capacity expansion and network management are
more properly regarded as alternative approaches to deal with
the problem of congestion. Which will be preferable in any par-
ticular case will vary with the circumstances and with their rela-
tive costs. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine a priori
which will prove the better solution at any particular moment.
The relative costs of each solution are also likely to change over
time, so any precommitment to one approach over the other
would likely have to undergo constant oversight and revision as
the underlying technology evolves.
B. The Growth of Peer-to-Peer Technologies
Another force driving the network neutrality debate is the
growing importance of peer-to-peer technologies. Although the
term "peer-to-peer" is often viewed as synonymous with file shar-
ing or user-generated content, it actually embodies a more fun-
damental distinction. In the traditional internet architecture,
content and other files are stored in large computers at central-
ized locations known as "servers." End users, known as "clients,"
request files from those servers, usually by submitting a short bit
of code such as a website address, also known as a uniform re-
source locator ("URL"). The server that hosts the requested files
then transmits the requested files through the internet to the
client.
In a peer-to-peer architecture, files are not stored in central-
ized locations, and the computers that are connected to the edge
of the network are not divided into clients requesting files and
servers hosting files. Instead, files are distributed across the
network, and edge computers simultaneously request files and
serve files. It is this less hierarchical structure that leads these
types of edge computers to be called "peers" and this type of ser-
vice to be called peer-to-peer. That peer-to-peer and user-
generated content are analytically distinct is underscored by the
fact that YouTube and many other repositories of user-generated
content employ client-server architectures, while Vuze and other
distributors of commercial media content employ peer-to-peer
architectures.
Whether a network is comprised primarily of clients and
servers or of peers has major architectural implications. If a net-
work is organized around a client-server architecture, the traffic
flowing from the server to the client tends to be greater than the
traffic flowing in the other direction. As a result, it usually
makes sense to divide the available bandwidth asymmetrically
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by devoting a greater proportion of the available bandwidth to
downloads and a smaller proportion to uploads. Such asymmetry
makes less sense if a network is organized around a peer-to-peer
architecture, since each end user represents an important source
of upload traffic as well as download traffic.
At the time that network providers established the basic ar-
chitectures for the major broadband technologies in the late
1990s, the internet was dominated by applications such as web
browsing and email that adhered to a client-server architecture.
As a result, most network providers assigned bandwidth asym-
metrically, devoting a greater proportion of the available band-
width to downloading rather than uploading. For example, the
dominant telephone-based technology is asymmetric digital sub-
scriber line ("ADSL") service, which initially supported theoreti-
cal speeds of up to 8 Mbps for downloading and 768 kbps for up-
loading. 52 More recent versions of ADSL support higher band-
width but still allocate it asymmetrically. 53 The initial cable mo-
dem architecture, designed around DOCSIS 1.0, supported
maximum theoretical speeds of 27 Mbps downstream and 10
Mbps upstream. 54 Finally, the service offered by wireless provid-
ers deploying EV-DO technologies is similarly asymmetrical,
with download rates exceeding upload rates by a ratio of eleven
to one. 55
Although some network neutrality proponents have criti-
cized those decisions as "short-sighted" or "poor network design
decisions," 56 those decisions were quite rational at the time they
were made. Since that time, network providers have begun de-
veloping new symmetric technologies, such as DOCSIS 2.0 for
cable modem systems and symmetric DSL ("SDSL") for wireline
systems. DOCSIS 3.0 retains a degree of asymmetry, but to a
52 See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capabil-
ity to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Acceler-
ate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of Telecommunications Act of 1996, Fourth
Report, 19 FCC Rec 20540, 20558 (2004) ("Fourth Section 706 Report").
53 See DSL Forum, About ADSL, available at <http://www.dslforum.orgflearndsl/
adslfaq.shtml> (last visited Feb 24, 2008).
54 See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capabil-
ity to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Acceler-
ate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third
Report, 17 FCC Rec 2844, 2917-18 21 (2002).
55 See Advanced Wireless Services in the 2155-2175 MHz Band, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 22 FCC Rec 17035, 17046 n 32 (2007).
56 Comments of Free Press et al, WC Docket No 07-52, at 21, 22 (2008), available at
<http://fa~foss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?nativeo-r-pdf-pdf&id-document-651984121
6> (last visited May 9, 2008).
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lesser degree than DOCSIS 1.0. Very-High-Data-Rate DSL
("VDSL") supports both symmetric and asymmetric services.
Indeed, even now it is far from clear whether a symmetric or
an asymmetric architecture will eventually prove to be the better
choice. For the four years preceding 2007, peer-to-peer traffic
surpassed client-server traffic in terms of percentage of total
bandwidth. 57 A remarkable change occurred in 2007. Client-
server traffic began to reassert itself, driven primarily by the
expansion of streaming video services, such as YouTube. Thus, in
2007, client-server traffic has retaken the lead from peer-to-peer,
constituting 45 percent of all internet traffic as compared with 37
percent of all traffic devoted to peer-to-peer.58
The growing importance of peer-to-peer technologies affects
the shape as well as the volume of the upload traffic. In many
ways, the effect is similar to the transformation that occurred
when internet users began to use dial-up modems attached to
conventional telephone lines. Before the emergence of the inter-
net, the typical telephone call lasted only three to five minutes. 59
Because calls were relatively short and different customers
tended to make calls at different times, telephone companies
were able to provide adequate service by providing enough
switching capacity to accommodate one fourth to one eighth of all
customers at any particular time. Dial-up internet calls, in con-
trast, tend to be longer, lasting approximately fifteen to twenty
minutes. 60 Although different parties disagreed as to the magni-
tude of the problem, no one doubted that increasing the length of
internet calls required greater switching and trunk line capac-
ity. 61
The same problem arises as traffic shifts to peer-to-peer
technologies. In a client-server architecture, where upload traffic
from end users consists of URLs requesting files, the short dura-
tion of the traffic relative to its frequency allows network provid-
ers to easily serve a large number of customers with only limited
upload capacity. But the longer session times associated with
57 See Ellacoya Networks, Press Release (cited in note 44).
58 See id.
59 Kevin Werbach, Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications Policy 58
(Fed Commc'ns Comm'n Off of Plans & Pol Working Paper No. 29, Mar 1997), available at
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp29.pdf> (last visited May 16,
2008).
60 Id at 59.
61 Dennis W. Moore, Jr., Note, Regulation for the Internet and Internet Telephony
Through the Imposition of Access Charges, 76 Tex L Rev 183, 196-97 (1997).
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peer-to-peer traffic reduce the ability of multiple end users to
share the same bandwidth. The effect is to require networks to
dedicate more capacity to serve the same number of users. In
addition, in a peer-to-peer architecture users do not simply up-
load URLs. Instead, they upload as well as download files. Be-
cause broadband networks allocate more bandwidth to download-
ing than to uploading, the emergence of peer-to-peer architec-
tures is making it more difficult for last-mile broadband provid-
ers to ensure adequate upload speeds and quality of service.
The shift to peer-to-peer also effectively increases the num-
ber of hours in a day that any particular computer can generate
upload traffic. In a client-server architecture, the amount of time
that any individual could sit in front of a computer placed a
natural limit on the amount of upload bandwidth that any one
subscriber could consume. In a peer-to-peer architecture, how-
ever, any computer that is left running can continue to generate
upload traffic even when no person is present. The result is that
the lion's share of upload traffic is generated by a small number
of superheavy peer-to-peer users. As few as 5 percent of end us-
ers may be responsible for generating more than 50 percent of all
internet traffic. 62
The emergence of peer-to-peer has also placed increased
pressure on network providers to change their pricing models.
Under the business model that currently dominates the internet,
end users are generally charged on an "all you can eat" basis, in
which end users can consume an unlimited amount of services
for a flat monthly fee. 63 Content and applications providers are
charged prices that vary with the amount of traffic they gener-
ate, typically pegged to the peak traffic that they generate over a
thirty-day period. 64 Under a client-server architecture, this pric-
ing regime did provide some basis for charging users for the
62 See David Vorhaus, Confronting the Albatross of P2P, at 1 (Yankee Group, May 31,
2007) (noting that 5 percent of users account for 50 percent of all traffic); Steven Levy,
Pay per Gig, Wash Post Di (Jan 30, 2008) (quoting Time Warner Cable spokesman offer-
ing similar statistics); See Comments of CTIA - The Wireless Association, WC Docket No
07-52, *12 (Feb 13, 2008) available at <http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
nativeor pdf=pdf&id document=6519841180> (last visited May 16, 2008) (noting that
one wireless provider reports that less than 5 percent of customers generate over 50 per-
cent of traffic).
63 See J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber, Cyberjam: The Law and Economics of
Internet Congestion of the Telephone Network, 21 Harv J L & Pub Pol 327, 340 (1998)
(describing how America Online's introduction of all you can eat pricing in December
1996 shifted the industry away from metered pricing).
64 95th Percentile Explained, Innovative Network Concepts, available at
<http://inconcepts.biz/cr/95th.html> (last visited May 9, 2008).
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amount of congestion they contributed to the network. Since
every single download required action by a content provider, the
amount of traffic downloaded by any particular content pro-
vider's server represented a somewhat effective measure of the
amount of congestion that that particular content provider was
imposing on the overall network.
This is not the case under a peer-to-peer architecture, in
which a single download from a content provider could generate
an untold number of additional downloads without increasing
the amount that the content provider would have to pay. As a
result, the amount of traffic generated directly from the content
provider no longer represents an accurate reflection of the
amount of congestion imposed on the entire network. Instead,
much of the download traffic is shifted to end users located
throughout the network. The obvious solution to this problem is
to make the prices paid by end users somewhat reflective of the
upload traffic that they generate. However, when Time Warner
attempted to impose such a regime in January 2008, it was
greeted by a torrent of criticism from the network neutrality
community. 65
The emergence of new peer-to-peer technologies, such as
BitTorrent, changes the calculus still further. Rather than re-
trieving a requested file from a single location, BitTorrent re-
trieves portions of the requested file from multiple computers. By
reducing the size of the file that must be uploaded from any par-
ticular computer, this ingenious approach has the potential to
improve the efficiency of bandwidth use dramatically by lessen-
ing the amount of capacity required from any particular location.
In addition, BitTorrent readjusts the locations from which it re-
ceives files dynamically. If one particular location is running
slowly, it can readjust its request to obtain the portion of the file
requested from that location to another location.
This process of dynamic readjustment also gives BitTorrent
a "swarming" quality that places the biggest burden on the loca-
tions with the fastest connections. As I shall explain in further
detail in the next Part, this burden falls particularly heavily on
technologies such as cable modem and wireless broadband pro-
viders in which end users share bandwidth with their neighbors
from the moment their traffic leaves their house. Indeed, studies
indicate that congestion becomes problematic when as few as
fifteen of the five hundred or so cable modem subscribers sharing
65 See note 9 and accompanying text.
194 [2008:
179] NETWORK NEUTRALITY, CONSUMERS, AND INNOVATION 195
the same fiber node run peer-to-peer filesharing programs. 66 It is
for this reason that dozens of internet service providers ("ISPs")
around the world restrict BitTorrent traffic in some way.67
Network providers thus confront a difficult decision. Not
only must they determine the size and the location of the capac-
ity to add. They must also determine the extent to which they
should continue to embrace an asymmetric architecture based on
their projections of the likely future success of applications such
as BitTorrent and YouTube. Any imperfections in their projec-
tions are likely to have significant economic consequences.
C. The Increasing Heterogeneity in Business Relationships
among Network Providers
Internet service providers have traditionally been divided
into three categories. Backbone providers occupy the center of the
network and offer high-speed transport between roughly a dozen
locations spread throughout the country. 68 Regional ISPs carry
traffic from the network access points served by backbone pro-
viders to the local distribution facilities maintained by last-mile
providers in individual cities (which in the case of DSL is usually
called a central office and in the case of cable modem systems is
usually called a headend).69 The final connection is provided by
last-mile providers, which use grids of wires or local networks of
wireless spectrum to carry the traffic from those central facilities
to end users. 70
66 See James J. Martin and James M. Westall, Assessing the Impact of BitTorrent on
DOCSIS Networks, in Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Broadnets (Sept 2007), available at
<http://people.clemson.edu/-jmarty/paperslbittorrentBroadnets.pdf> (last visited Apr 19,
2008). See also Leslie Ellis, BitTorrent's Swarms Have a Deadly Bite on Broadband Nets,
Multichannel News (May 8, 2006), available at <http:flwww.multichannel.com/article/
CA6332098.html> (last visited Apr 19, 2008).
67 Azureus Wiki, available at <http://www.azureuswiki.com/index.php/Bad-ISPs>
(last visited Apr 19, 2008).
68 Yoo, 94 Georgetown L J at 1860 (cited in note 1).
69 Id.
70 Id.
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FIGURE 1: THE ORIGINAL STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNET
During these early days, each regional ISP maintained a
business relationship with precisely one backbone, through
which it exchanged all of its traffic that it could not terminate
locally. The one-to-one relationship dictated that there was typi-
cally only one path for connecting any two points. The unique-
ness of the connections made the network quite vulnerable to
congestion. It also made the internet quite hierarchical, with the
backbones playing a role in transmitting the vast majority of
traffic, which in turn provided backbones with a potential source
of market power.
In addition, the business relationships were relatively sim-
ple. The largest backbones exchanged traffic through a system
known as peering. Rather than metering and billing each other
for the traffic they exchanged, top level backbones exchanged
traffic on a settlement free basis in which no money changed
hands. So long as the volume of traffic passing in each direction
is roughly symmetrical, both backbones will be in roughly the
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same economic condition as they would have been had they me-
tered and billed each other for the traffic they exchanged. 71
Peering is not economical in cases where the value of the
traffic being terminated is not reciprocal. As a result, smaller-
volume backbones are often required to enter into "transit" ar-
rangements in which they must pay larger backbones to termi-
nate their traffic. 72
Over time, these business relationships began to become
more heterogeneous. Backbones began to enter into private in-
terconnection agreements. This allowed them avoid the conges-
tion at the network access points. The bilateral nature of the ex-
change also made it easier for them to manage quality of ser-
vice. 73 At the same time, backbones began entering into paid
peering relationships to compensate networks that were provid-
ing greater value. 74
71 Id at 1877. Peering also involves a number of characteristics aside from settlement
free termination. For example, peering partners engage in hot potato routing, in which
they hand off traffic at the first mutual point of interconnection. Id at 1871 n 113. In
addition, backbones can only peer traffic that they can terminate themselves. Any traffic
that must be handed off to another backbone for termination must travel via transit.
Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones 5 (FCC Office of
Plans and Policy Working Paper No 32, Sept 2000), available at <http://www.fcc.gov/
Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp32.pdf> (last visited May 9, 2008).
72 Yoo, 94 Georgetown L J at 1877 (cited in note 1).
73 P. Faratin et al, Complexity of Internet Interconnections: Technology Incentives and
Implications for Policy 28 (paper presented at the 35th Annual Telecommunications Pol-
icy Research Conference), available at <http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers2007/797/
Clark%20Lehr%20Faratin%20Complexity%20Interconnection%20TPRC%202007.pdf>
(last visited Mar 6, 2008).
74 Id at 14; OECD Working Party on Telecommunications and Information Services
Policies, Internet Traffic Exchange: Market Developments and Measurement of Growth
21-22 (Apr 5, 2006), available at <http://icttoolkit.infodev.org/en/Publication.3081.html>
(last visited May 9, 2008).
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FIGURE 2: THE EMERGENCE OF SECONDARY PEERING
AND MULTIHOMING
Secondary Peering
Regional ISPs also began to connect to more than one back-
bone, a practice that became known as multihoming. 75 Regional
ISPs that were too small to peer with the top-tier backbones also
began to economize on transit charges by entering into secondary
peering relationships, in which regional ISPs bypass the tier-1
backbones altogether and exchange traffic with each other on a
settlement free basis.7 6 These changes had several benefits. The
avoidance of transit charges reduced the costs borne by end us-
ers. Secondary peering and multihoming also made the network
more robust by creating additional paths connecting particular
points. 77 In fact, as much as seventy percent of the nodes in the
internet can communicate with one another without passing
through the public backbone.78 This had the additional benefit of
75 See Yoo, 94 Georgetown L J at 1871 n 111 (cited in note 1).
76 See id at 1872.
77 See Shai Carmi et al, A Model of Internet Topology Using k-Shell Decomposition,
104 Proc of the Natl Acad of Sci 11150, 11151 (2007).
78 See id.
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weakening the market position of the top-tier backbones. 79 It did
mean greater variance in the price paid by different types of traf-
fic.
Furthermore, some content and application providers began
to use content delivery networks like Akamai, which reportedly
handles over fifteen percent of the world's web traffic.80 Akamai
caches web content at over fourteen thousand locations through-
out the internet. When an end user sends a request for a web-
page, the last-mile broadband provider checks to see whether
that webpage is hosted by Akamai. If so, the last-mile provider
redirects the query to the cache maintained by Akamai. This
process often allows the resulting traffic to bypass the public
backbone altogether. 81
The sheer number of caches all but guarantees that the clos-
est Akamai cache will be located closer to the end user than the
server hosting the primary webpage. As a result, content served
by Akamai is less likely to be plagued by problems of latency.8 2
In addition, the redundancy in Akamai's server network not only
insulates the content Akamai hosts from denial of service at-
tacks; it also allows the system to redirect queries to other caches
when particular caches are overly congested.8 3 All of these devel-
opments represent innovative solutions to adjust to the realities
of the internet. It means, however, that different providers often
pay different amounts for similar services depending on the pre-
cise path taken through the network.
D. Variations in the Ways Congestion Can Arise in Different
Transmission Technologies
Network providers must base their investment plans on
their projections of the magnitude, location, and shape of the
traffic that they will have to support. In the local transmission
portions of the network, moreover, the various broadband tech-
nologies differ widely in their susceptibility to congestion.
79 See Yoo, 94 Georgetown L J at 1872 (cited in note 1).
80 See id at 1882-83 ('The leading content delivery network, known as Akamai, re-
portedly maintains more than fourteen thousand servers and handles more than fifteen
percent of the world's web content.").
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See Yoo, 94 Georgetown L J at 1872 (cited in note 1).
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FIGURE 3: ARCHITECTURES OF THE MAJOR BROADBAND
TRANSMISSION TECHNOLOGIES
DSL Architecture Wireless Broadband
without Architecture
Remote Terminal
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(noDSLAM)1B(Aol
DSL Architecture with Cable Modem
Remote Terminal Architecture
Consider first the architecture of DSL. DSL customers typi-
cally use a pair of copper wires dedicated exclusively to them to
connect to the nearest central office, in which the telephone com-
pany maintains a piece of equipment known as a DSL access
multiplexer ("DSLAMV") to separate the voice traffic from the
data traffic. Because DSL customers connect to the DSLAM
through a dedicated connection, their traffic is not typically ag-
gregated with other traffic until it reaches the central office. 84 As
a result, the local connection between DSL customers' premises
and the central office is not subject to congestion at the
neighborhood level. The primary constraint is that modern ADSL
can only serve customers located within eighteen thousand feet(roughly three and a half miles) of a DSLAM.8 6 To serve custom-
ers located more than three and a half miles from a central office,
local telephone companies sometimes deploy DSLAMs in satellite
facilities known as remote terminals, which are in turn con-
84 See Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and
Constitutional Connections, 88 Cornell L Rev 885, 1003-04 (2003).
85 See Yoo, 19 Yale J Reg at 255 (cited in note 25).
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nected to the central office through optical fiber.8 6 AT&T is de-
ploying a higher speed DSL technology known as very-high-
speed DSL ('-DSL") that requires the placement of remote ter-
minals within two to four thousand feet of every customer.8 7 Be-
cause DSL customers have dedicated connections to the DSLAM,
their traffic is not aggregated with other traffic until it reaches
the remote terminal. As a result, DSL customers do not share
bandwidth with other customers in the link between their prem-
ises and the remote terminal, and thus that portion of the net-
work is not subject to congestion.88
The situation is quite different in cable modem systems,
which are based on a hybrid fiber coaxial ("HFC") architecture.
Under an HFC architecture, the copper coaxial cables connecting
individual customers' premises are reconfigured into a ring con-
figuration and connected to a satellite facility known as a
neighborhood node. The node is in turn connected by optical fiber
to the headend.8 9 Unlike under DSL, traffic generated by indi-
vidual cable modem customers shares bandwidth with the traffic
generated by their neighbors from the moment it leaves their
house.90 As a result, the quality of service that any particular
cable modem customer receives is considerably more sensitive to
the bandwidth consumption of their immediate neighbors.
The congestion problems confronted by wireless broadband
providers are even more severe. Wireless broadband providers
connect to the internet through transponders located on micro-
wave towers and other high-altitude locations. Because the ca-
pacity of any one transponder is limited, customers attempting to
connect to the same tower compete for bandwidth with their
neighbors. 91 Thus, like cable modem service, wireless broadband
service is sensitive to local congestion.
This problem is exacerbated in the case of wireless broad-
band by two other considerations. First, wireless broadband op-
erates under bandwidth constraints that are much more restric-
86 See William P. Rogerson, The Regulation of Broadband Telecommunications, the
Principle of Regulating Narrowly Defined Input Bottlenecks, and Incentives for Investment
and Innovation, 2000 U Chi Legal F 119, 141-42.
87 See Sean Buckley, There's Gold in That Copper, Telecommun Intl 19 (Jan 1, 2007).
88 See Yoo, 94 Georgetown L J at 1862 n 71 (cited in note 1).
89 See Spulber and Yoo, 88 Cornell L Rev at 1014-15 (cited in note 84).
90 See Yoo, 94 Georgetown L J at 1862 n 71 (cited in note 1).
91 See Comments of CTIA-The Wireless Association, WC Docket No 07-52, at 7
(cited in note 62).
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tive than those faced by DSL or cable modem systems. 92 Second,
in DSL and cable modem systems, broadband traffic is carried in
a different channel than traffic associated with the other services
provided by the company. For example, in the case of DSL, con-
ventional voice traffic is transmitted through a different channel
than data traffic. 93 Similarly, in a cable network, conventional
video traffic is transmitted through a different channel than data
traffic. 94 Thus, broadband traffic cannot degrade the quality of
service of telephone and cable companies' core businesses no
matter how much it increases. This is not true in the case of
wireless. Wireless broadband shares bandwidth with the voice
services offered by wireless companies. Consequently, any con-
gestion that may arise in a wireless network degrades not only
the quality of internet broadband services provided; it also de-
grades the conventional voice services that represent the wire-
less providers' core business.95
It should thus come as no surprise that different types of
providers vary in their tolerance for local congestion, with some
taking more aggressive efforts to manage it and some taking
less. It should also come as no surprise that different types of
providers would manage congestion on a different geographic
scale, depending on the nature of their technology. These techno-
logical realities caution strongly against adopting a one-size-fits-
all approach to network management. Indeed, any regulatory
solution that might be imposed must be carefully tailored to take
these important variations into account.
II. POTENTIAL CONSUMER BENEFITS FROM DEVIATING FROM
NETWORK NEUTRALITY
An examination of the literature on the economics of regula-
tion provides both supply-side and demand-side considerations
showing how deviations from network neutrality might provide
net benefits to consumers. I begin by reviewing the supply-side
justifications and follow that by examining the demand-side jus-
tifications. This Part concludes by examining the relevance of the
literature on two-sided markets, which incorporates both de-
mand-side and supply-side considerations.
92 See id at 9.
93 See id at 7.
94 See id.
95 See Comments of CTIA-The Wireless Association, WC Docket No 07-52, at 7
(cited in note 62).
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A. Supply-Side Justifications for Prioritization and
Differential Pricing
1. Maximizing consumer welfare in the presence
of congestion.
a) The role of congestion-based pricing. When the internet
first emerged, it provided only a single class of service and em-
ployed relatively simple pricing schemes with respect to both end
users and content and applications providers. With respect to
end users, although some internet service providers initially
charged end users on a per-minute basis, "all you can eat" pric-
ing, in which end users could consume an unlimited amount of
services for a single monthly fee, soon emerged as the industry
standard. 96 Network providers typically charge content and ap-
plication providers fees related to their usage. In particular, they
typically sample the bandwidth used every five minutes and
charge the content or applications provider based on their peak
usage over a thirty-day period. 97 In order to avoid penalizing con-
tent and applications providers for short-run, transient surges in
traffic, they typically base the charge on the ninety-fifth percen-
tile of traffic, which effectively excuses the thirty-six hours with
the heaviest bandwidth use. 98
The relative simplicity of these pricing schemes harms con-
sumers in at least two ways. First, a network that only charges
end users a uniform, all you can eat price is likely to set its price
to reflect the amount of bandwidth consumed by the average
user. Such a regime represents a windfall to end users with
above-average levels of consumption of network services. At the
same time, it overcharges end users whose consumption of net-
work services falls below the average. The net effect of having a
single class of service is to force low-volume users to pay for more
bandwidth than they need, which may force some of them to
forego subscribing to the internet even though the benefits they
would derive from doing so would exceed the costs. It also has
the effect of forcing low-volume users to cross subsidize high-
volume users. 99
96 See note 63 and accompanying text.
97 95th Percentile Explained (cited in note 64).
98 Id.
99 Yoo, 94 Georgetown L J at 1853-55, 1877 (cited in note 1) (describing how flat-rate
pricing "forces low-volume users to cross subsidize those who place more intensive de-
mands on the Internet").
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Second, as I have discussed elsewhere at length, all you can
eat pricing schemes tend to induce excessive levels of conges-
tion.100 Congestion can arise at any one of a number of points in
the network. As an initial matter, congestion can arise in the
last-mile broadband network that connects the end users' prem-
ises to the central facilities maintained by local broadband pro-
viders. In the case of a cable modem system, the facility is called
a headend, and in the case of DSL, it is called a central office. 101
Congestion can also arise within the regional ISP that connects
the local network to the public backbone, the backbone itself, or
the regional ISP or last-mile provider on the terminating end.
Lastly, congestion can arise in the content server being ac-
cessed. 1 0 2
The contestability of the internet dictates that network per-
formance depends in no small part on the volume being gener-
ated by other end users at any particular time. Put a different
way, every end user's usage imposes congestion costs on all other
end users. If the network is operating well-below capacity, the
congestion costs may be negligible. If the network is operating
close to capacity, the congestion costs may be significant.
Aggregate consumer welfare increases when end users in-
crease their usage levels if and only if the benefits they would
derive from doing so exceed the congestion costs they would im-
pose on other users. If the costs exceed the benefits, consumers
would be better off if end users would refrain from increasing
their usage. 103
100 Id at 1864-65 (showing how "flat-rate pricing results in excessive consumption of
club resources, which arises because the congestion costs represent a negative externality
that individual club members responsible for causing the congestion are not forced to
bear").
101 Id at 1860-62. Cable modem systems are particularly susceptible to local conges-
tion, given that local traffic in cable modem systems is first aggregated in a neighborhood
facility known as a fiber node. As many as five hundred households share bandwidth
provided by a fiber node.
102 See id at 1862-63 (describing how congestion can arise at each of these points in
the network).
103 Frischmann and van Schewick criticize me for failing to recognize that internet
usage creates positive as well as negative externalities. Frischmann and van Schewick,
47 Jurimetrics J at 398-403 (cited in note 12). The focus of their criticism misunder-
stands the nature of my argument as well as the proper role of exemplifying theory. As I
noted earlier, in showing how the negative externalities is associated with congestion can
cause excessive consumption of network resources, I was simply presenting an exemplify-
ing theory to rebut calls for per se rules categorically prohibiting certain practices by
showing circumstances under which they actually benefit consumers. As I have noted
earlier, offering exemplifying theories pointing in the other direction does not reestablish
the case for per se illegality. Absent empirical evidence regarding the likelihood of which
externalities will dominate, the existence of potential, offsetting externalities and the
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The problem is that the pricing regimes that dominate the
internet fail to give end users an incentive to behave in the way
that maximizes consumer welfare. Specifically, under all you can
eat pricing, the cost of increasing usage is always zero. End users
thus have the incentive to continue increasing their consumption
even when the benefits they derive begin to approach zero. The
problem is that the congestion costs associated with that in-
creased usage imposed on other end users are greater than zero.
The fact that individual end users do not internalize the conges-
tion costs they impose on others causes them to continue to in-
crease their consumption even when doing so would reduce con-
sumer welfare. Although the amount of time any one person
could spend in front of a computer once placed a natural limit on
the amount of bandwidth that any particular end user could con-
sume, modern peer-to-peer technologies can adjust dynamically
to allow network usage to expand to fill all available capacity. 104
The classic solution to this problem is to set the cost of in-
cremental usage equal to the congestion costs that that usage
would impose on other users. Perfect congestion-based pricing
would cause users to internalize the costs they impose on others
and in so doing would provide them with the incentives to cali-
brate their network usage at the level that would maximize the
welfare of all consumers. As a theoretical matter, perfect conges-
tion-based pricing would maximize the aggregate benefits en-
joyed by all consumers.
Congestion problems can also arise from the way certain
content providers design their websites. For example, ESPN has
configured its website to download video content in the back-
ground automatically. 105 The result is that the website will con-
sume significant bandwidth completely outside the end user's
control. Again, these problems could theoretically be solved by
imposing congestion-based pricing on content and applications
providers as well.
possibility that the market is not in general equilibrium renders the net impact of those
externalities on consumer welfare ambiguous, making it impossible to draw any a priori
inferences about the practice's likely consumer impact. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright
and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U Pa L Rev 635, 685-86 & n
163 (2007). Thus, if anything, the existence of exemplifying theories pointing in both
directions actually supports the case-by-case approach that I have advanced over the
categorical prohibitions favored by network neutrality proponents.
104 See notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
105 ESPN Motion Frequently Asked Questions, available at <http://espn.go.com/
motionlfaq.html#gen5> (last visited May 9, 2008).
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b) Difficulties in implementing congestion-based pricing. The
problem is that true congestion-based pricing is difficult to im-
plement. Consider first one approach suggested by some network
neutrality proponents: offering consumers different service
tiers. 106 Under this approach, network providers meter each end
user's usage and charge for the tier of service that reflects that
user's total bandwidth consumption. Network neutrality advo-
cates have adopted different positions with respect to whether
consumer tiering is consistent with network neutrality. While
some recognize consumer tiering as an acceptable way to manage
network traffic, 10 7 others have greeted attempts to introduced
metered billing with sharp criticism. 108
The fundamental problem is that the amount of congestion
generated by any particular end user depends on more than just
the total amount of bandwidth consumed. It also depends on the
timing of that usage in relation to the usage patterns of all other
end users. Thus, heavy bandwidth users might impose minimal
congestion if they confine their usage to times when few other
users are on the network. Conversely, a light bandwidth user
might nonetheless become a significant source of congestion
should that user choose to use the network at a time of heavy
network usage. Thus, merely counting bits may represent a poor
measure of congestion costs and thus may not provide sufficient
incentive for individual end users to behave in a way that maxi-
mizes consumer welfare.
Another classic solution to the problems posed by congestion
of timing is time-of-day or peak-load pricing. 10 9 Under this ap-
proach, individual end users face higher usage charges during
those times of day when the overall network usage is likely to be
highest. Indeed, peak-load pricing schemes should be quite famil-
iar to those who pay lower rates for long distance calls placed in
106 See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J on Telecommun
& High Tech L 141, 154 (2003) (arguing in favor of offering different tiers of service in-
stead of discriminating against particular applications).
107 See id; Lessig testimony 2, 9-10 (cited in note 10).
108 See note 9 and accompanying text.
109 Frischmann and van Schewick argue that peak-load pricing may represent a better
second-best solution to the problems of congestion than the proxies I propose, such as
restrictions on applications and content. See Frischmann and van Schewick, 47 Jurimet-
rics J at 396 (cited in note 12) ("Even a crude system of peak load pricing based on the
time of day might suffice to effectively limit congestion; the objective from an efficiency
perspective is not necessarily to internalize all congestion externalities.'); id at 405
('There are numerous ways to implement imperfect usage-sensitive pricing based on the
existing technology for metering usage: peak-load pricing based on time of day may be
one of them.").
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the evening and at night and to those with wireless plans that
offer free night and weekend minutes.
The need to reduce congestion costs once led network pro-
viders to experiment with peak-load pricing in local telephone
service, which is another service typically priced on an all you
can eat basis. Some network elements, most notably the copper
loop connecting individual customers to the telephone company's
central office, are not shared with other end users and are thus
not subject to congestion. Other network elements, such as
switching, are shared with other customers and thus are subject
to congestion. The presence of these congestible elements led
many analysts to speculate that charging higher rates at times of
high congestion would yield substantial consumer benefits and
convinced some local telephone companies to experiment with a
form of imposing peak-load pricing known as "local measured
service."
Empirical studies indicate that local telephone companies'
experiments with local measured service either harmed consum-
ers or yielded benefits that were so small that they were likely to
be consumed by the transaction costs of administering the sys-
tem. 110 Understanding why local measured service failed to de-
liver the expected welfare benefits provides insights into the in-
herent limitations of peak-load pricing. The problem is that
peak-load pricing schemes cause inefficiencies of their own."'
Consider the peak-load pricing scheme represented in Figure 4,
in which the time of day is represented on the horizontal access
and the total congestion (measured in congestion cost) is repre-
sented on the vertical access. Assume that the goal is to impose a
110 See Rolla Edward Park and Bridger M. Mitchell, Optimal Peak-Load Pricing for
Local Telephone Call 6, 32 (Rand Paper No. R-3404-1-RC Mar 1987) (concluding that
local measured service is unlikely to increase economic efficiency because the modest
welfare gains from discouraging excessive calls at peak times were more than offset by
costs of administering the system and the inefficiency of deterring efficient calling); Lewis
Perl, Impacts of Local Measured Service in South Central Bell's Service Area in Kentucky
(May 21, 1985) (finding that imposition of local measured service in Kentucky yielded
welfare gains of only 0.11 percent), cited by Alfred E. Kahn and William B. Shew, Current
Issues in Telecommunications Regulation: Pricing, 4 Yale J Reg 191, 237 n 10 (1987);
Bridger Mitchell, Optimal Pricing of Local Telephone Service, 68 Am Econ Rev 517, 531-
32 (1978) (estimating the welfare changes from imposing local measured service as rang-
ing between -1.6 percent and 6.0 percent). For an overview, see Alfred E. Kahn and Wil-
liam B. Shew, Current Issues in Telecommunications Regulation: Pricing, 4 Yale J Reg
191, 237-38 & n 110 (1987) (reviewing the empirical literature assessing the welfare
impact of local measured service).
111 For a similar argument, see Frischmann and van Schewick, 47 Jurimetrics J at
406 (cited in note 12).
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peak-load price during the busiest time of the day, represented in
Figure 4 as the interval between ti and t2.
FIGURE 4: INEFFICIENCIES OF PEAK LOAD PRICING
P3
P -------------------------
Congestion Cost
t I t2 tim e
Some degree of inefficiency will result regardless of whether
the network sets price at the lowest congestion cost during this
period (represented by pi), the highest congestion cost during
this period (represented by p2), or a price set somewhere in be-
tween (represented by p3). Consider first price, pi. Because pi
falls below the congestion costs created by incremental usage at
every point during the peak-load period, setting price at pi would
encourage end users to increase their consumption of network
resources even when the congestion costs of doing so would ex-
ceed the benefits. On the other hand, because p2 exceeds the con-
gestion cost created by incremental usage at every point during
the peak load period, pricing at p2 would deter usage even
though increasing usage would increase consumer welfare. Set-
ting the price in between at pa gives rise to both of these prob-
lems during different portions of the peak load period. During
the middle of the peak-load period, pa would fall below the con-
gestion costs associated with incremental usage and thus would
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provide end users with the incentive to increase their consump-
tion even when the congestion costs imposed on others would
exceed the benefits that that end user would derive from doing
so. At the beginning and concluding portions of the peak-load
period, p3 would exceed the congestion cost, in which case pricing
at p3 would deter additional usage even when increasing con-
sumption would cause consumer welfare to increase.
An additional problem is that end users inevitably respond
to the imposition of peak-load pricing by shifting some of their
usage to the periods immediately preceding and following the
peak-load period. The result is to create "shoulders" in the distri-
bution of traffic on either side of the peak-load period. If this re-
allocation is sufficiently large, it can cause congestion costs out-
side the peak-load period to rise to welfare-reducing levels. As a
result, networks that use peak-load pricing typically find it nec-
essary also to impose near-peak rates (sometimes also called
"shoulder rates") during the period immediately preceding and
following the peak-load period. Near-peak rates suffer from the
same consumer welfare problems discussed above associated
with peak-load rates, albeit to a smaller degree.
The resulting pricing scheme also increases the complexity
of the decision confronting consumers, requiring them to incur
the costs of keeping track of the price at any particular time of
day and adjusting their behavior accordingly. Consumers gener-
ally show considerable resistance to complex pricing schemes. 112
As a result, although these problems could be mitigated by divid-
ing the peak-load pricing regime into a larger number of seg-
ments, analysts of local measured service concluded that con-
sumers would not accept any more than three pricing periods
over the course of a day. 113 In addition, if end users are allowed
to choose between a metered pricing plan and an all you can eat
pricing plan, high-volume users have the strategic incentive to
opt for the latter. Together these problems dissipated the pre-
dicted welfare benefits from imposing peak-load pricing on local
telephone service.
The failure of local measured service provides a real-world
demonstration of the challenges posed by peak-load pricing. The
migration of the wireless telephone pricing away from pricing
that was metered on a per-minute basis to a form of peak-load
112 Werbach, Digital Tornado 63 (cited in note 59).
113 Park and Mitchell, Optimal Peak-Load Pricing for Local Telephone Calls 23-31
(cited in note 110).
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pricing based on buckets of minutes to the more recent move-
ment toward all you can eat pricing plans attests to the difficul-
ties and consumer resistance confronted by any attempt to im-
plement any form of congestion-based pricing.
There are aspects to internet traffic likely to make peak-load
pricing of broadband service even less likely to benefit consum-
ers. As an initial matter, internet traffic is much more variable
than telephone traffic. For example, web browsing tends to gen-
erate sharp peaks of bandwidth usage followed by long periods of
inactivity while the end user reads the webpage that has just
been loaded. The result is that congestion on the internet is
likely to arise much more abruptly and be much more transient
than on telephone networks, which makes it much more difficult
to determine whether and to what degree additional usage by
one consumer will adversely affect other consumers. 114
Congestion on the internet can also often be quite localized
in technologies, such as cable modem and wireless broadband
service, in which subscribers share bandwidth with their imme-
diate neighbors. When that is the case, the network performance
that any particular subscriber receives is acutely sensitive to the
amount of traffic being generated by a very small number of
closely situated fellow users. As a result, it is possible that con-
gestion might be very high in one neighborhood while simultane-
ously being very low in the adjacent neighborhood, depending on
the size and bandwidth intensity of the traffic being generated by
end users in each neighborhood at any given time. This means
that a properly functioning congestion-pricing scheme would
have to do more than impose different prices during different
times of the day. It would also have to adjust prices to the condi-
tions arising in different portions of the network, depending on
the local conditions in any particular neighborhood node. 115
Lastly, any congestion-based pricing system would have to
take into account packet switched networks' ability to compen-
sate for surges in demand by routing around areas of congestion
in ways that circuit switched traffic associated with conventional
telephone service cannot. While the ability to reroute traffic may
mean that increases in congestion need not necessarily degrade
network performance, the ability to route around trouble spots
114 See Spulber and Yoo, 99 Nw U L Rev at 1700 (cited in note 51) (showing how
greater variability in demand can make congestion more difficult to manage).
115 See id at 1700, 1709-11 (showing how congestion can affect different portions of
the network in different ways and discussing the difficulties of creating geographically
targeted approaches to managing congestion).
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can also have the effect of transferring congestion to areas of the
network that are geographically distant from where network
flows are increasing. This can make determining the effect that
any particular increase in traffic will have on the size and loca-
tion of congestion very difficult to determine. 116
Fully deployed congestion-based pricing must thus incorpo-
rate information about the precise level of network flows and ca-
pacity in all portions of the network at any particular time in
order to determine the magnitude of the congestion cost caused
by any particular increase in network traffic. Such information
was relatively easy to collect in local telephone systems, which
have historically been dominated by incumbent local exchange
carriers well positioned to collect such information. The internet,
however, operates on very different principles. Indeed, the decen-
tralized nature of the internet necessarily dictates that no player
has access to all of the information needed to assess all of the
systemic effects. 117
Thus, although imposing bandwidth tiering or peak-load
pricing would capture some of the aspects of congestion pricing,
institutional considerations may well force the outcomes under
both regimes to fall short of the ideal. 118 This is not to say that
116 See id at 1703-07, 1711 (demonstrating how networks' ability to compensate for
increases in demand by routing traffic along alternative paths can transfer congestion to
other portions of the network located quite far from the locations where demand is in-
creasing, which can make congestion particularly hard to manage).
117 See Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Access to the Broadband
Internet, 22 Harv J L & Tech (forthcoming 2008) (contrasting the difficulties in applying
graph theoretical models to the internet with relatively successful efforts to apply graph
theoretical models to electric power through institutions like PJM).
118 Although Frischmann and van Schewick acknowledge that any system of usage-
sensitive pricing would be imperfect, they nonetheless assert that an imperfect system
would nonetheless assert that "the social costs of reasonably imperfect usage-sensitive
pricing seem to be lower than the social costs associated with use restrictions." Frisch-
mann and van Schewick, 47 Jurimetrics J at 406 (cited in note 12). They provide no em-
pirical support for this assertion, basing their argument on theoretical models. The scant
empirical evidence that exists, which is based on efforts to impose congestion-based pric-
ing in local telephone and wireless telephone service, raises at least some doubts about
whether usage-sensitive pricing will in fact yield benefits. Furthermore, even accepted for
all it is worth, their argument suggests that the welfare implications are ambiguous and
depend on the particular circumstances and the relative costs of implementing each insti-
tutional approach. When that is the case, the general thrust of competition policy articu-
lated by the Supreme Court is not to prohibit any particular practice categorically. In-
stead, actors should be permitted to experiment with available second-best solutions to
the problems of congestion unless and until consumer harm is shown.
In some ways, their argument parallels arguments about price discrimination.
Like perfect congestion-based pricing, perfect price discrimination is always welfare en-
hancing. The problem is that perfect price discrimination is never possible. The ambigu-
ousness of the welfare implications of imperfect price discrimination led Frischmann to be
reticent about embracing price discrimination. See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic
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peak-load pricing schemes are necessarily doomed to failure. On
the contrary, it is quite possible that the reduced transaction
costs associated with simple pricing schemes may well offset any
imperfections in the ability to account for congestion costs. 119 For
the purposes of this article, we need not resolve this ambiguity.
The existence of plausible circumstances under which peak-load
pricing is likely to fail effectively rebuts suggestions that peak-
load pricing represents a sufficient alternative to justifying treat-
ing any solution to the problems of congestion as illegal per se.
Simply put, the existence of multiple exemplifying theories point-
ing in different directions undercuts categorically any particular
practice and instead simply underscores the propriety of adopt-
ing a case-by-case approach.
2. Consumer benefits from network diversity.
In addition, as I have discussed extensively in my prior
work, 120 permitting network providers to differentiate their ser-
vices can benefit consumers by increasing the degree of competi-
tion between last mile services. The classic source of market con-
centration in markets for last-mile services is the supply-side
economies of scale that arise when entry requires the incurrence
of significant, up-front fixed costs. The presence of large, up-front
capital investments gives the largest firms a decisive economic
advantage. The ability to spread those investments over a larger
Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 Minn L Rev 917, 979 (2005). This
is despite the fact that leading economic textbooks generally conclude that, despite the
theoretical ambiguity, imperfect price discrimination is more likely to cause consumer
welfare to increase. See, for example, Richard G. Lipsey et al, Economics 241 (Harper-
Collins, 8th ed 1987), F.M. Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and
Economic Performance 495 (Houghton Mifflin, 3d ed 1990). Absent some empirical evi-
dence that the inefficiencies associated with imperfect congestion pricing are likely to
exceed the inefficiencies associated with use restrictions, one would have expected that
the imperfections in congestion-based pricing would have made him equally hesitant.
119 See Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason and Hal R. Varian, Pricing Congestible Network
Resources, 13 IEEE J on Selected Areas Comm 1141, 1145 (1995).
120 For my more comprehensive statements of this argument, see Yoo, 19 Harv J L &
Tech at 27-33 (cited in note 22); Yoo, 3 J on Telecommun & High Tech L at 60-63 (cited
in note 34).
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customer base allows them to underprice their smaller competi-
tors until they drive them out of business. 121
What has been largely overlooked is how allowing networks
to differentiate themselves can counterbalance the economies of
scale created by large, up-front fixed costs. It is the fact that
price is the only dimension along which firms can compete that
gives the largest players their decisive advantage. A different
equilibrium can result if competitors are allowed to compete
along dimensions other than price. If so, a smaller player would
be able to survive, notwithstanding lower sales volumes and
higher unit costs (and thus higher prices), by tailoring its net-
work towards services that a subsegment of the market values
particularly highly. The greater value provided by the differenti-
ated network allows a specialized provider to generate sufficient
revenue to cover its up-front costs even though its volume is sig-
nificantly smaller than that of the leading players.
The result is an equilibrium in which multiple players co-
exist despite the presence of unexhausted economies of scale.
Even though entrants may operate at a cost disadvantage vis-A-
vis their larger rivals, they are able to survive by offering prod-
ucts designed to appeal to discrete subsegments of the customer
base. Conversely, preventing product differentiation would cause
the market to devolve into a natural monopoly.
How could such differentiation occur in the context of broad-
band? One way is through protocol nonstandardization, such as
through the adoption of a different routing protocol. If discrete
subgroups of end users place sufficiently different valuations on
different types of applications, multiple networks may be able to
coexist simply by targeting their networks towards the needs of
different subgroups. If demand is sufficiently heterogeneous, the
121 For example, if a producer must incur $1,000 in up-front costs to enter the market,
the up-front costs would contribute the following amounts toward unit (i.e., average) cost:
Contribution Contribution
Quantity to Unit Cost Quantity to Unit Cost
100 $10.00 600 $1.67
200 $5.00 700 $1.43
300 $3.33 800 $1.25
400 $2.50 900 $1.11
500 $2.00 1000 $1.00
If the impact from the amortization up-front costs dominates the impact of variable costs,
average cost will decline. Note that the impact of up-front costs tends to decay exponen-
tially as the quantity over which the up-front costs are spread increases.
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greater utility derived from allowing end users to consume ser-
vices that they value more highly can more than compensate for
any cost disadvantages resulting from the reduction in volume.
For example, it is conceivable that network diversity might make
it possible for three different last-mile broadband networks to
coexist: one optimized for traditional internet applications such
as e-mail and website access, another incorporating security fea-
tures to facilitate e-commerce and to guard against malware, and
a third that prioritizes packets in the manner needed to facilitate
time-sensitive applications such as streaming media and virtual
worlds. As I will subsequently discuss in Part III D, exclusivity
arrangements with particular content or application providers
can provide another basis for differentiating network services.
These examples illustrate how deviations from network neu-
trality may benefit consumers by facilitating greater competition
in the last mile. This suggests that public policy may well be bet-
ter served if Congress and the FCC were to embrace a network
diversity principle that would allow networks to experiment with
differentiating their services in precisely this manner. Con-
versely, mandating network neutrality can have the perverse
effect of reinforcing this source of market failure by limiting net-
works to competing on price and network size, factors that favor
the largest providers. If true, this raises the possibility that
mandating network neutrality could turn into the source of,
rather than the solution to, market failure.
3.Alternative institutional solutions.
The fact that metered pricing and peak-load pricing schemes
inevitably require the incurrence of transaction costs has led
network providers to experiment with different institutional so-
lutions. One particularly interesting solution to the problems of
congestion is content delivery networks like Akamai.122 As noted
earlier, content served by Akamai often bypasses the public
backbone altogether, which in turn protects the query from any
backbone congestion that may exist. 123 The proximity and re-
dundancy of the caches permits Akamai to serve content faster
and to redirect queries to other caches when particular caches
are overly congested. 124 Although the dynamic way that Akamai
122 See notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
123 Id.
124 Id.
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reallocates queries can improve network performance, it can also
make congestion less predictable and can make it more difficult
to identify sources of congestion.
The problem from the standpoint of network neutrality is
that Akamai is a commercial service that is only available to con-
tent and applications providers willing to pay a premium above
and beyond the basic internet access fees that all content and
applications providers pay. 125 It thus violates the basic network
neutrality principles that all like traffic travel at the same speed
and that network providers be prohibited from charging content
and applications providers more for higher-speed service.
On some occasions, network providers have taken to block-
ing access to websites when proven to be harmful. The best
known of these examples is the practice of denying computers
sending suspiciously large volumes access to port 25, which is the
port that plays a key role in spam. Some networks estimate that
this practice reduces the total amount of spam by as much as
twenty percent. 126 Again, blocking port 25 violates the principle
of treating all like content alike and may well have the effect of
blocking legitimate emails. And yet, the practice of blocking port
25 is relatively uncontroversial.
In addition, ISPs that detect end users using applications
that consume large amounts of bandwidth (such as leaving their
browser open to the ESPN website or engaging in large amounts
of peer-to-peer file sharing) will suggest to the end users that
they change their practices or purchase a higher-bandwidth ser-
vice that more accurately reflects the amount of congestion they
are imposing on other end users. 127 If the end user is unwilling to
change, the ISP may choose to cease doing business with the cus-
tomer.
I recount other examples of alternative institutional solu-
tions short of imposing full-fledged congestion-based pricing
elsewhere. 128 All of these practices are to some degree inconsis-
125 To the extent that Akamai's price structure contains imperfections in the inter-
nalization of congestion costs, it may give rise to welfare losses similar to those caused by
the imperfections in congestion pricing discussed above.
126 See Jim Hu, Comcast Takes Hard Line Against Spare, CNET News.com (June 10,
2004), available at <http://news.com.com/2100-1038_3-5230615.html> (last visited Mar 6,
2008) ("Already, Comcast has noticed a 20 percent reduction in spam since the blocks
began and a 75 percent decline in the past two months.").
127 Dan Mitchell, Say Good Night, Bandwidth Hog, NY Times C5 (Apr 14, 2007).
128 See Yoo, 94 Georgetown L J at 1874-85 (cited note 1) (institutional solutions in-
clude prohibiting the resale of bandwidth or acting as an internet service provider; impos-
ing restrictions on home networking, attaching devices, and operating file servers; and
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tent with the principles advocated by network neutrality propo-
discriminating against particular applications and against particular content). Frisch-
mann and van Schewick take issue with some of these examples. For example, they argue
that bans on online games are overinclusive because many online games do not require
much bandwidth. At the same time, they acknowledge that some online games are band-
width intensive. See Frischmann and van Schewick, 47 Jurimetrics J at 408-09 (cited in
note 12). Whether a ban on an application is a good proxy for congestion is thus an em-
pirical question that cannot be answered a priori and thus seems better suited to case-by-
case analysis.
In fact, prohibitions on particular applications and content are quite common. For
example, the State of Arkansas has banned the use of peer-to-peer applications because
they "were utilizing a significant amount of bandwidth at the State's public schools"; as a
result the State found the ban necessary "[t]o ensure that teachers and students had a
high level of network quality speed, and availability." Allot Communications, Press Re-
lease, Allot Helps Arkansas Provide Government Agencies and Public Schools with Guar-
anteed Bandwidth and Improved Network Quality (Jan 3, 2007), available at
<http://www.allot.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=449&Itemid=18>
(last visited May 27, 2008). For similar reasons, the Department of Defense has banned
YouTube "in an effort to boost its network efficiency," noting, "This is a bandwidth and
network management issue. We've got to have the networks open to do our mission. They
have to be reliable, timely and secure." Leo Shane III and T.D. Flack, DOD Blocking
YouTube, Others, Stars and Stripes (May 13, 2007), available at <http://www.stripes.coml
article.asp?section=lO4&article=53421&archive=true> (last visited May 27, 2008). These
are end-user networks, rather than internet access networks. Nonetheless, the basic
intuition is the same. Although in an ideal world it might be preferable always to take a
content and application neutral approach to bandwidth management, sometimes use
restrictions targeted at particular content or applications can represent a quick and cost-
effective (albeit imperfect) way to manage congestion.
Similarly, Frischmann and van Schewick argue that a ban on WiFi routers or
home networking "ha[s] no predictive power with respect to the bandwidth intensity of
the corresponding uses." See Frischmann and van Schewick, 47 Jurimetrics J at 408
(cited in note 12). While not perfectly predictive of the amount of congestion generated, it
strikes me that use of a technology that enables subscribers to attach multiple computers
to the network is at least somewhat (albeit imperfectly) probative of the amount of con-
gestion that the average subscriber will generate. Resolving which of us is correct is ulti-
mately an empirical question, but the record to date does not offer any concrete evidence
indicating either that use of WiFi routers either is strongly associated with higher band-
width usage (in which case the prohibition would be reasonable) or is completely unre-
lated to higher bandwidth usage (in which case preventing network owners from prohibit-
ing WiFi routers would be reasonable). In the absence of a clear policy inference, the
approach to competition policy laid out by the Supreme Court would support eschewing
any categorical prohibitions or mandates in favor of the type of case-by-case approach
that I have advocated.
Lastly, Frischmann and van Schewick acknowledge that operating a fileserver
does represent a valid Coasean proxy for congestion. Id at 409. Their recognition that at
least one use restriction represents a good proxy for congestion concedes the existence of
at least one exemplifying theory suggesting that permitting network providers to impose
some use restrictions may in fact benefit consumers to the point that a categorical ban on
all use restrictions may be socially harmful. More to the point, the entire controversy
between Comcast and BitTorrent centers on the fact that peer-to-peer architectures re-
quire end users to operate servers. Recognizing that a ban on operating servers repre-
sents a good proxy for heavy bandwidth usage provides some support for the idea that
permitting network providers to ban servers may represent one of the institutional alter-
natives for managing congestion that should be given serious consideration. Of course, it
is impossible to tell a priori whether it will be the best of the available second-best alter-
natives. That said, the plausibility does provide a strong argument against rules categori-
cally prohibiting the practice.
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nents. In pointing out these practices, I make no attempt to show
that any particular practice is always beneficial or always harm-
ful or to make any assessment of which is likely to prove best.
Indeed, the rapid pace of change in terms of cost and functional-
ity would make any such assessment too ephemeral a basis for
policymaking. My point is that policymakers will find it difficult,
if not impossible, to determine the relative merits of any of these
alternative institutional solutions at any particular time, let
alone keep up with the rapid pace of technological change. So
long as some plausible argument exists that a practice might be
socially beneficial, 129 the better course is to establish rules that
give network operators the flexibility to experiment with that
practice until its precise impact on consumers can be determined.
B. Demand-Side Justifications for Differential Pricing
The academic literature on the economics of regulation offers
demand-side as well as supply-side justifications for charging
differential prices. Although the modern literature on price dis-
crimination is vast, 130 the key insight can be traced to the 1927
article by Frank Ramsey that proposed an innovative solution to
the classic pricing problem confronted by telecommunications
networks. 131
The nature of the problem can be most easily understood by
examining the relationship between the average cost curve and
the marginal cost curve, which are the two cost curves that re-
ceive the most attention from scholars of industrial organization.
The production of most goods and services requires the incur-
rence of two types of costs: fixed costs and variable costs. Fixed
costs are capital costs that are incurred once and do not increase
as production increases. Variable costs are those that increase
129 Note that practices do exist that are so likely to be socially harmful and so unlikely
to convey any plausible benefits that there is general agreement they should categorically
prohibited. The classic example is horizontal price fixing by a cartel. See, for example,
Catalano, Inc v Target Sales, Inc, 446 US 643, 646-47 (1980) (calling horizontal price
fixing the "archetypical example" of a practice that is so "plainly anticompetitive" that it
is conclusively presumed illegal without any exploration of any offsetting benefits").
130 For surveys of the literature on price discrimination, see Hal R. Varian, Price Dis-
crimination, in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig eds, 1 Handbook of Industrial
Organization 597 (Elsevier 1989); and Lars A. Stole, Price Discrimination and Competi-
tion, in Mark Armstrong and Robert K. Porter eds, 3 Handbook of Industrial Organiza-
tion 2221 (Elsevier 2007).
131 See F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 Econ J 47 (1927)
(offering the seminal statement of the pricing scheme that would ultimately bear his
name).
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with the production of additional units. For example, in the case
of shoe manufacturing, the cost of setting up the shoe factory
would represent a one-time cost that does not vary with the
number of shoes produced and thus constitutes part of the fixed
cost. The costs of leather, labor, and electricity increase as the
number of units increases and thus constitute part of the vari-
able cost. Average cost is determined by adding the fixed costs
and variable costs to determine total costs and dividing the total
costs by the total quantity produced. Marginal cost focuses on the
cost of the last unit produced.132 Thus, if a production process is
subject to unexhausted economies of scale, the cost of the last
unit produced (that is, marginal cost) may fall below average
cost. Conversely, if a production process is subject to disecono-
mies of scale, the cost of the last unit produced should exceed
average cost.
As depicted in Figure 5, the interaction of both fixed and
variable cost determines the relative position of the average and
marginal cost curves and gives both curves their characteristic
"U' shape. Because fixed cost does not vary with production, it
has no impact on marginal cost. Fixed cost does exert downward
pressure on average cost as the up-front cost is spread across
increasingly larger volumes. The impact of variable cost is
somewhat more complex. In general, most production processes
benefit from a degree of economies of scale, which allows firms to
produce units of a good more cheaply as production increases. 133
Together these effects cause both average and marginal cost to
decline at low levels of production, with the marginal cost curve
lying below the average cost curve.
132 Or, more properly, the production of one additional unit beyond current levels of
production.
133 Some of the scale economies result from specialization, as demonstrated most
eloquently by Adam Smith's example of a pin factory. See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 4-5 (Edwin Canaan ed, Modern Library
1965) (1776) ("[A] workman not educated to th[e] business [of pin making] ... could
scarce, perhaps, with his utmost industry, make one pin a day.... But in the way in
which this business is now carried on, ... the important business of making a pin is...
divided into about eighteen distinct operations .. . ." In this way, a pin factory can make
"about twelve pounds of pins in a day."). Other scale economies are technological. Higher
volumes make it cost effective for manufacturers to use more capital equipment that
requires higher up-front costs, but lowers unit costs.
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FIGURE 5: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AVERAGE
AND MARGINAL COST
MC
The situation begins to change as production increases. The
downward impact of fixed cost on average cost decays exponen-
tially as the fixed cost is amortized over increasingly large vol-
umes. One presumes that the firm initially turned to the lowest
cost inputs that it could find. Once those supplies are exhausted,
any further increases in production inevitably require the firm to
turn to sources of inputs that are more expensive. As a result,
variable cost begins to rise. This causes the downward pressure
on marginal cost caused by the initial economies of scale in vari-
able cost to dissipate and eventually begin to be replaced by up-
ward pressure. As the upward pressure associated with variable
cost increases and the downward pressure associated with fixed
cost decreases, eventually the former dominates the latter and
average cost begins to increase. The marginal and average cost
curves will cross at the lowest point of the average cost curve,
indicated in Figure 5 by Q*.
As noted earlier, consumers benefit the most if production is
increased whenever the benefit to consumers from producing an-
other unit (reflected by the marginal consumer's willingness to
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
pay) exceeds the cost of producing another unit (reflected by the
marginal cost curve). Maximizing consumer welfare thus re-
quires increasing production whenever price exceeds marginal
cost. It is thus when consumer benefits no longer exceed the costs
to society (that is, when price equals marginal cost) that no fur-
ther gains are possible. This leads to the familiar economic prin-
ciple that consumer welfare is maximized when price is set equal
to marginal cost. At the same time, producing firms must break
even for an industry to be viable over the long run, which means
that price must also be set at or above the average cost curve.
Finding prices that simultaneously equal marginal cost and
equal or exceed average cost is quite feasible if the overall de-
mand exceeds Q*. For any quantity greater than Q*, any price
that maximizes consumer welfare by being set equal to marginal
cost necessarily exceeds average cost and thus is sustainable.
The classic pricing problem occurs if the total market demand
falls below Q*. In that case, any price set along the marginal cost
curve necessarily falls below average cost and thus is unsustain-
able. Thus, if producing firms are to break even, they must be
allowed to charge prices that represent both the variable cost
plus a share of the fixed cost. The allocation of fixed cost inevita-
bly causes price to exceed marginal cost, which in turn necessar-
ily reduces consumer welfare by excluding some consumers who
would derive benefits from being allowed to consume an addi-
tional unit that would exceed the cost of permitting them to do
so. Thus any price that is sustainable fails to maximize consumer
welfare, and any price that maximizes consumer welfare is in-
herently unsustainable.
Ramsey identified an ingenious solution to this conundrum
based on the fact that consumers vary in their sensitivity to price
changes. Some consumers are very price sensitive and will dras-
tically reduce their purchases in response to any increase in
price. These consumers are said to have relatively elastic de-
mands. Other consumers are less price sensitive and will respond
to price increases by reducing their purchases only minimally.
These consumers are said to have relatively inelastic demands.
Ramsey realized that the loss in consumer welfare that arises
when producers are forced to price above marginal cost would be
minimized if the firm allocated a larger proportion of the fixed
cost to consumers who are the least price sensitive (and thus are
more likely to maintain high purchase levels even if price in-
creases above marginal cost) and allocated a smaller proportion
of the fixed costs to those who are the most price sensitive (and
[2008:220
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thus are more likely to curtail their purchases sharply in re-
sponse to increasing price above marginal cost). The additional
revenue made possible by this form of price discrimination en-
ables the firm to be sustainable even in the presence of signifi-
cant up-front fixed cost. Indeed, if fixed cost is allocated in strict
inverse proportion to every consumer's elasticity demand, Ram-
sey pricing can enable the firm to produce the quantity that
maximizes consumer welfare.
As a result, economic commentators from a wide variety of
perspectives have embraced demand-side price discrimination as
a way to maximize aggregate consumer benefits in industries
that require substantial fixed-cost investments. 134 Note that this
solution depends on the ability to charge customers different
amounts for the exact same product. The price differential is
based not on supply-side considerations, such as variations in the
cost of providing of the product, but rather solely on demand-side
considerations, specifically variations in the elasticity of the cus-
tomers' demand for the product.
The problem is that, as is the case with any scheme of per-
fect price discrimination, the informational requirements for a
fully implemented Ramsey pricing scheme are unrealistically
demanding. It requires the firm to know each consumer's elastic-
ity of demand and to devise a pricing scheme that makes sure
that each consumer pays the exact price implied by the elasticity
of their demand. Effective Ramsey pricing would also require a
system for preventing high-elasticity consumers who pay low
134 See, for example, Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, Competition in Telecom-
munications xv (MIT 2000) ('Marginal-cost pricing for all services is not viable in telecom
industries (at least in certain important segments involving large joint and common
costs), so the relevant benchmark requires some markups. Allowing at least some price
discrimination can therefore reduce the pricing distortion."); Scherer and Ross, Industrial
Market Structure at 502 (cited in note 118) ("Price discrimination can also provide ways
out of an efficiency dilemma encountered in regulated natural monopoly industries.");
William J. Baumol and Daniel G. Swanson, The New Economy and Ubiquitous Competi-
tive Price Discrimination: Identifying Defensible Criteria of Market Power, 70 Antitrust L
J 661, 671-73 (2003) (showing how price discrimination is essential in high fixed cost
industries and occurs even when those industries are competitive); Harold Demsetz, The
Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J L & Econ 293, 301-03 (1970) (showing how price
discrimination permits the production of public goods in which all of the costs are fixed
and allocates resources efficiently); Benjamin Klein and John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Com-
petitive Price Discrimination as an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual Property Refus-
als to Deal, 70 Antitrust L J 599, 611-15 (2003) (showing how price discrimination in
industries characterized by high fixed cost and lower marginal cost is likely to enhance
consumer welfare and economic efficiency); Michael E. Levine, Price Discrimination
Without Market Power, 19 Yale J Reg 1, 9-17 (2002) (showing how Ramsey pricing and
other forms of price discrimination can promote economic efficiency in industries in which
fixed costs are shared by multiple consumers).
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prices from reselling their purchases to low-elasticity consumers
who are asked to pay higher prices. Thus, any real world attempt
to implement Ramsey pricing would necessarily be imperfect.
This renders its welfare impact ambiguous, although many lead-
ing economic theorists suggest that imperfect price discrimina-
tion is more likely than not to increase consumer welfare. 135
Ramsey pricing thus offers a plausible demand-side justifi-
cation for charging similarly situated consumers and con-
tent/application providers different amounts for the same ser-
vice. Doing so could well benefit consumers by allowing more of
them to purchase the product than would be possible under a
pricing regime that requires charging all end users who consume
the same product the same amount. Ramsey-style price discrimi-
nation can be exercised on the server side as well by charging
content and applications providers different amounts based on
their elasticity of demand. The enhanced ability to recover fixed
cost made possible by Ramsey pricing can also enable high fixed-
cost providers to exist when they would not otherwise be able to
do so. However, it is precisely this type of differential pricing
that network neutrality would prohibit.
C. The Relevance of Two-Sided Markets
As noted earlier, some network neutrality proponents have
taken the position that network providers should be allowed to
charge different prices to end users consuming different amounts
of bandwidth (that is, consumer tiering), but not to content and
applications providers (that is, access tiering). 136 Determining
whether or not this would represent good policy requires taking
into account the fact that the internet is a two-sided market.137
For a market to be two-sided requires more than just the exis-
tence of a buyer and a seller. Two-sided markets arise when net-
work economic effects create demand interdependencies that
cause the value that any one party derives from participating in
the platform to depend not only on price, but also on the number
135 See note 118.
136 See text accompanying note 10.
137 For some of the leading contributions to the field, see Mark Armstrong, Competi-
tion in Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND J Econ 668 (2006); Bernard Caillaud and Bruno
Julien, Chicken & Egg: Competition Among Intermediation Service Providers, 34 RAND J
Econ 309 (2003); David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Mar-
kets, 20 Yale J Reg 325 (2003); and Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, Platform Com-
petition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J Eur Econ Ass'n 990 (2003). For a recent survey, see
Roberto Roson, Two-Sided Markets: A Tentative Survey, 4 Rev Network Econ 142 (2005).
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of other platform participants. 138 Unlike the conventional ap-
proach to network economics, in which the size of the network
economic effect depends on the number of participants within the
same group, in two-sided markets the network economic effect is
determined by the number of participants in a different group
located on the other side of the market. 139
Pricing in two-sided markets depends on a wide variety of
factors including the elasticities of demand, the magnitude of the
indirect network effects, and the marginal costs borne by each
side of the market, among others. 140 A survey of practices re-
vealed that prices on different sides of two-sided markets tend to
be asymmetric, with end users often paying little or nothing. 4 1
138 In the absence of network economic effects, price is the only determinant of value,
in which case markets face few obstacles to functioning properly.
139 A classic example of the kind of network usually analyzed through the lens of
network economics is the telephone system, in which the value of the network is deter-
mined by the number of similarly situated users that use the platform in the same way.
See, for example, Neil Gandal, Compatibility, Standardization, and Network Effects:
Some Policy Implications, 18 Oxford Rev Econ Pol 80, 80 (2002) (listing telephone sys-
tems as among "[t]he most common examples" of a network subject to direct network
effects); Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 Colum
Bus L Rev 257, 300 (calling the telephone system "the classic example of the positive
network externality"); Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the
Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J Pol Econ 822, 823 (1986) (noting that network
externalities "have long been recognized of physical networks such as the telephone ...
industr[y]"); Mark A. Lemley and David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Eco-
nomic Effects, 86 Cal L Rev 479, 488-89 (1998) (citing telephones as one of the "classic
examples of actual network goods"); S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, Network
Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, J Econ Persp, Spring 1994, at 133, 139-40 (calling
the telephone network "[t]he paradigmatic case of a direct network effect"); Peter Menell,
Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 Stan L Rev 1329, 1340 (1987) (call-
ing the telephone "a classic example of a product for which there are network external-
ities").
In a two-sided market like the internet, value to content and application providers
is not determined just by price or by how many other content and applications providers
participate in the platform. Instead, the demand interdependency created by advertising-
based business models makes the value depend on a combination of price and the number
of end users.
140 David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, The Industrial Organization of Markets
with Two-Sided Platforms 11 (Natl Bur Econ Res Working Paper 11603, Sept 2005),
available at <http://www.nber.org/papers/wll603> (last visited Mar 6, 2008) ('The opti-
mal prices depend in a complex way on the price elasticities of demand on both sides, the
nature and intensity of the indirect network effects between each side, and the marginal
costs that result from changing output of each side."). See also Jean-Charles Rochet and
Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: An Overview 34-35 (Mar 12, 2004), available at
<http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/rochettirole.pdf> (last visited Apr 10, 2008)
("[F]actors that affect prices charged to end-users" include "[e]lasticities," the "[rielative
market power of service providers," the "[slurplus on the other side," "[p]latform competi-
tion and multi-homing" and "[b]undling.").
141 See Evans and Schmalensee, The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-
Sided Platforms at 8, 12-13 (cited in note 140) ('The empirical evidence suggests that
prices that are at or below marginal cost are common for [two-sided platforms]."); Rochet
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Two features bear highlighting. First, the fact that partici-
pation on one side of a two-sided market creates network eco-
nomic effects on the other side can create a positive externality
that is so large that, if internalized through prices, leads end
user prices to be set below marginal cost. 142 Second, any pricing
regime implicitly incorporates a proportion of the fixed cost to
recover from each side of the two-sided market. The logic of
Ramsey pricing would suggest that the allocation depends on the
relative elasticities of demand. This results in prices that are not
purely cost-based. This reasoning receives an interesting twist in
the case of a two-sided market, as the prices must also reflect the
contributions to the other side's surplus created by network eco-
nomic effects. 143
The theoretical literature on two-sided markets suggests
that preventing network providers from imposing discriminatory
prices against content and applications providers may harm con-
sumers in two ways. First, the reduced ability to cover fixed costs
will cause fewer new networks to be created. This is particularly
important as the internet makes the transition from converting
legacy networks, such as cable television and local television
networks, to creating new networks, such as Verizon's new fiber-
based FiOS service. Second, limiting network providers' ability to
recover fixed cost from the server side of the two-sided market
and Tirole, 1 J Eur Econ Assn at 1013-17 (cited in note 137) (examining seven case stud-
ies in which fees tended to be highly asymmetric and often charged consumers little or
nothing).
142 See Wilko Bolt and Alexander Tieman, A Note on Social Welfare and Cost Recovery
in Two-Sided Markets 6, 9 (DNB Working Paper No 24, Dec 2004), available at <http://
www.dnb.nl/dnb/home/file/Working%2OPaper%2ONo.%2024-2004_tcm47-146681.pdf>
(last visited Apr 10, 2008) ("[S]ocially optimal pricing in two-sided markets leads to an
inherent cost recovery problem, inducing losses for the monopoly platform. The result is
driven by the positive externality on users on one side of the market, which originates
from network participation on the other side of the market. The contribution of this ex-
ternality to social welfare is larger than the individual market side's price, which leads
pricing below marginal cost to be socially optimal."); Evans and Schmalensee, The Indus-
trial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms at 11-12 (cited in note 140) (For
two-sided platforms, "[t]he profit-maximizing, non-predatory prices may be below the
marginal cost of supply for that side or even negative."); Roson, Two-Sided Markets, 4 Rev
Network Econ at 147-48 (2005) (cited in note 137) (showing that prices may turn out to
be zero or even be negative if the network economic effects on the other side of the market
are sufficiently strong).
143 Rochet and Tirole, 1 J Eur Econ Assn at 991 (cited in note 137) (noting that so-
cially optimal prices differ from classic Ramsey in that they "are not driven solely by
superelasticity formulae but also reflect each side's contribution to the other side's sur-
plus').
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may increase the proportion of fixed costs they must recover from
the end user side. 144
The potential for consumer harm is particularly problematic
in light of the fact that content and applications providers are
increasingly turning to advertising-based business models, in
which the bulk of the revenue flows into the network on the
server side. 145 The historic pattern of cash flows in advertising-
driven industries suggests that the increasing emphasis on ad-
vertising increases the value of expanding the end user base,
which in turn should put downward pressure on the prices
charged to end users. This in turn implicates what Jean-Charles
Rochet and Jean Tirole have called the "topsy-turvy principle," in
which any factor that tends to increase prices on one side of a
two-sided market tends to lower prices on the other side, because
the increased margin provided on the higher prices charged on
the first side increases the benefits of increasing participation on
the second side. 146 Conversely, limiting network providers' ability
to charge different prices to content and applications providers
may have the side effect of forcing consumers to bear a greater
proportion of the fixed cost.
This insight underscores the fallacy in an argument often
advanced by network neutrality proponents that allowing net-
work providers to employ access tiering will cause consumers to
144 For related arguments, see Larry F. Darby and Joseph P. Fuhr, Jr., Consumer
Welfare, Capital Formation and Net Neutrality: Paying for Next Generation Broadband
Networks, 16 Media L & Pol 122, 133 (2007) (noting that the socially optimal prices vary
on each side of the market and that "for multisided markets, the optimal market solu-
tions cannot generally be achieved by charging only consumers"); J. Gregory Sidak, A
Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the Internet, 2 J Compe-
tition L & Econ 349, 361-62 (2006) ("In short, each party in a two-sided market can con-
tribute to the recovery of the sunk costs required to build a broadband network. There is
certainly no basis in economic theory to presume that it would be socially optimal for end-
users to pay for all of the cost...").
145 See Faratin et al, Complexity of Internet Interconnections at 13 (cited in note 73)
("[The emergence of the commercial Internet with high-volume, high value (e.g. with
advertising) content has triggered a pragmatic conclusion that value flow is the same as
packet flow. Money flows in at the content end (e.g. via the advertising or merchant reve-
nues)...").
146 Rochet and Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: An Overview at 34 (cited in note 140) (The
'topsy-turvy principle': A factor that is conducive to a high price on one side, to the extent
that it raises the platform's margin on that side, tends also to call for a low price on the
other side as attracting members on that other side becomes more profitable."). Indeed, if
the advertising revenue collected by content and applications and providers is sufficiently
large, end user prices may even become negative. See Mark Armstrong and Julian
Wright, Two-Sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts, 32 Econ
Theory 353, 354 (2007) ("[B]uyers may be charged nothing to subscribe, while sellers will
be charged a price that decreases in the extent to which the platform would like to set a
negative price for buyers.").
226 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2008:
pay twice. 147 On the contrary, the literature on two-sided mar-
kets suggests that suppressing access tiering can increase the
prices consumers pay by forcing them to bear costs that would
otherwise be borne by content and application providers.
Finally, the theoretical literature indicates that optimal
prices in two-sided markets are determined by demand elastic-
ities and network economic effects as well as marginal cost.148
Thus, any attempt to regulate the terms of access in a two-sided
market will require that prices reflect more than just the cost
data that regulatory authorities usually take into account. It will
also require regulators to consider each customer's elasticity of
demand as well as the magnitude of the network economic effects
on the other side of the two-sided market. This task is far more
complex than the task usually faced by public utility regulators.
The informational requirements even surpass those required un-
der Ramsey pricing, which requires demand elasticity informa-
tion in addition to cost. Thus any attempt to regulate access in
two-sided markets would require the development of sophisti-
cated new regulatory tools.149
147 See Consumers Union, Press Release, Importance of the Internet Public Support
for Net Neutrality, Consumers Union (Jan 18, 2006), available at <http:/!
www.consumersunion.org/pub/pressreleases/003060.html> (last visited Mar 6, 2008)
(quoting Ben Scott, policy director of Free Press, stating that "[r]equiring Internet com-
panies to pay for high-speed access to the Internet when they're already charging con-
sumers for the same service means consumers will ultimately pay twice."); Arshad Mo-
hammed, SBC Head Ignites Access Debate, Wash Post D1 (Nov 4, 2005) (quoting Vonage
Chairman Jeffrey Citron as stating, "[any notion that SBC or anyone else ... can get
paid twice on the same service is a bit ludicrous," adding that it would be like UPS de-
manding the sender and recipient of a package both pay for delivery."); Marguerite Rear-
don, Without "Net Neutrality," Will Consumers Pay Twice?, CNET News.com (Feb 7,
2006), available at <http://www.news.comlWithout-Net-neutrality%2C-will-consumers-
pay-twice/2100-1034_3-6035906.html?tag-item> (last visited Mar 6, 2008) (framing the
issue as whether consumers will have to pay twice); Dionne Searcey and Amy Schatz,
Phone Companies Set Off a Battle Over Internet Fees: Content Providers May Face
Charges for Fast Access; Billing the Consumer Twice?, Wall St J Al (Jan 6, 2006) (quoting
Vonage Chairman Jeffrey Citron as stating, "[tihey want to charge us for the bandwidth
the customer has already paid for," and that customers who already pay for high-speed
internet access will end up paying even more if online services pass the new access
charges to consumers).
148 See Evans and Schmalensee, The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-
Sided Platforms at 11 (cited in note 140); Rochet and Tirole, Two-Sided Markets at 34-35
(cited in note 140).
149 See David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, The Economics of Interchange Fees
and Their Regulation: An Overview 34-35 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory
Studies 2005), available at <http://aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.
php?fname=../pdffilesphp6A.pdf> (last visited Mar 6, 2008) (noting the difficulties con-
fronted by traditional price regulation, that price regulation in two-sided markets would
"require far more empirical information than classic public utility regulation," and that
applying the cost-based tools associated with traditional rate regulation would not be
socially optimal, and that any attempt to apply a better approach "could at best yield
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I do not mean to suggest that allowing network providers to
vary the prices they charge content and applications providers
will necessarily benefit consumers. It is quite possible as a theo-
retical matter that this type of pricing flexibility might cause
consumers to pay higher prices if end users' demand is suffi-
ciently inelastic and the benefits they generate to content and
applications providers in advertising revenue is sufficiently
small. That said, the increasing emphasis on advertising would
appear to make it more likely that consumers would benefit. In
any event, my argument does not depend on a definitive resolu-
tion of this empirical ambiguity. Simply showing a realistic pos-
sibility that permitting greater pricing flexibility might yield
consumer benefits represents an exemplifying theory sufficient
to rebut calls for a ban on access tiers and differential pricing
even if exemplifying theories were to exist pointing in the other
direction. The possibility that particular practices might be ei-
ther harmful or beneficial does not justify prohibiting them cate-
gorically. Instead, it favors a case-by-case approach that allows
network providers to experiment with different pricing regimes
unless and until a concrete harm to competition can be shown.
Preventing network providers from prioritizing traffic, re-
stricting the use of certain applications, or varying the prices
they charge to their customers thus has the potential to reduce
consumer welfare, not only by limiting network providers' ability
to induce end users to rationalize their consumption, but also by
preventing them from engaging in pricing mechanisms or em-
ploying proxies that require content and applications providers
to bear a greater proportion of the fixed costs. But these are not
the only potential harms that might flow from mandating net-
work neutrality. As I will discuss in the next Part, network neu-
trality can also harm consumers by reducing innovation.
III. POTENTIAL INNOVATION BENEFITS FROM DEVIATING FROM
NETWORK NEUTRALITY
Network neutrality proponents generally oppose giving pri-
ority to traffic originating from particular users or associated
with particular applications. They argue that innovation in con-
tent and applications depends on the ability to reach as wide a
highly imprecise estimates.").
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universe of potential customers as possible. They insist that in-
novation will suffer if all content and application providers can-
not access the internet on the same terms. 150
A close analysis of the economics of innovation raises serious
doubts about the position taken by network neutrality propo-
nents. Deviations from network neutrality can in fact enhance
innovation. Conversely, preventing such deviations can forestall
many new applications from emerging.
A. The Role of Prioritization
Many network neutrality proponents suggest that ensuring
that all internet content and applications can interconnect on
equal terms is essential for the internet to remain the inter-
net. 151 This argument implicitly suggests that the entire internet
should be governed by a single protocol.
As I have pointed out elsewhere, this suggestion overlooks
the fact that every protocol inherently favors some applications
over others. 152 Consider TCP/IP, which is the protocol that cur-
rently dominates the internet. TCP/IP has two distinctive fea-
tures. First, it routes traffic on a "best efforts basis." This means
the protocol makes no guarantees that any particular packet will
arrive at its destination. For example, suppose that packets ar-
rive at a router more quickly than the router can clear them, ei-
ther because of limitations in its own processing capacity or be-
cause its outbound links are busy. When that occurs, under
TCP/IP the router has no choice but to discard packets. That
leaves the receiving computer to signal the sending computer
that it is missing a packet so that the sending computer can re-
150 See, for example, Lessig testimony 4 (cited in note 10) ("By minimizing the control
by the network itself, the 'end-to-end' design maximizes the range of competitors who can
innovate for the network. Rather than concentrating the right to innovate in a few net-
work owners, the right to innovate is open to anyone, anywhere. That architecture, in
turn, has created an astonishing range of important and economically valuable innova-
tion.").
151 Id at 3 ("The Internet has inspired a wide range of innovation. Because of its par-
ticular architectural design, that innovation has come primarily from the 'edge' or 'end' of
the network through application competition.... One consequence of this design is that
early network providers could not easily control the application innovation that happened
upon their networks.... That architecture, in turn, has created an astonishing range of
important and economically valuable innovation. Here, as in many other contexts, compe-
tition has produced growth. And that competition was assured by the network's design.").
152 See Yoo, 19 Harv J L & Tech at 20-22, 25 (cited in note 22) ("Simply put, any
choice of standardized protocol has the inevitable effect of favoring certain applications
and disfavoring others, just as TCP/IP discriminates against applications that are time
sensitive and end-to-end favors innovation at the edge over innovation in the core.").
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send it. Second, TCP/IP routes traffic on a first-come, first-served
basis.
The delays associated with dropped packets did not repre-
sent a significant problem for the applications that dominated
the early internet, such as email and web browsing, which fo-
cused on text and in which delays of a fraction of a second were
essentially unnoticeable. As the number and diversity of users
has grown and applications technology has improved, users have
begun to use newer applications that are increasingly band-
width-intensive and less tolerant of delay. Leading examples are
internet telephony (also known as voice over internet protocol or
VoIP),153 streaming audio and video, real-time graphics-intensive
games and virtual worlds (such as World of Warcraft and Second
Life), and heart monitors and other forms of telemedicine. When
combined with the dramatic increase in total network traffic, the
advent of these new bandwidth-intensive and delay-intolerant
applications has greatly increased the pressure on the network to
take additional steps to manage congestion and to guarantee
quality of service. Without some types of adjustment, these forms
of innovative new content and applications, as well as others that
are not yet deployed, may not be able to survive.
1. The limitations of increasing bandwidth as a solution.
Network providers can respond to the increasing diversity of
applications, some of which are more tolerant of delay, some of
which are not, in one of several ways. If they do not want to dis-
tinguish between different applications, they can continue to ex-
pand capacity until they provide enough capacity to carry the
peak-load volume of traffic at speeds that satisfy the delay-
intolerant applications. In fact, many network neutrality advo-
cates contend that congestion could be alleviated (and network
management rendered unnecessary) if network providers would
simply increase bandwidth. 154
153 Interestingly, bandwidth may have increased to the point where VoIP is able to
function well without any quality of service guarantees. Edward W. Felten, Nuts and
Bolts of Network Neutrality 9 (July 6, 2006), available at <http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/
pub/neutrality.pdf> (last visited May 9, 2008). In addition, VoIP generally employs an
alternative protocol known as user datagram protocol (UDP) that increases transmission
speeds by omitting attempts to resend any packets that do not arrive or arrive with er-
rors.
154 See Lessig, Future of Ideas at 47 (cited in note 14) ("But proponents of these
changes often overlook another relatively obvious solution-increasing capacity.).
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As an initial matter, relying on the expansion of bandwidth
as the only solution to congestion presumes that network provid-
ers are able to anticipate how much additional bandwidth will be
needed and precisely where it will be needed. 155 The reality is
that some degree of misestimation is inevitable. The geographic
distribution of end users may deviate from forecasted patterns.
New applications may produce unanticipated demand. In addi-
tion, unanticipated developments in complementary technologies
can cause congestion to increase so quickly that increasing
bandwidth is not a feasible solution. Given that bandwidth can-
not be expanded instantaneously, any underestimation of de-
mand will lead to congestion for which increasing bandwidth
may not be an available solution. The question from the stand-
point of network neutrality is whether policymakers should cate-
gorically exclude some forms of network management as options
even in the absence of demonstrated harm.
A classic example of this problem, which I have discussed in
my earlier work, arose on the NSFNET in 1987. Prior to that
time, end users connected to the NSFNET via dumb terminals. 156
As a result, the bandwidth that any one end user could consume
was limited by the speed with which that end user could enter
keystrokes. All of this began to change with the introduction of
the personal computer. Once personal computers could be con-
nected to the network, end users could use the network to trans-
fer files. The resulting congestion caused terminal sessions to
run unacceptably slowly. NSFNET's solution was to reprogram
the network to give terminal sessions priority over file transfer
sessions, based largely on the fact that end users found delays in
file transfer sessions more tolerable than delays in terminal ses-
sions. The emergence of the PC represents precisely the type of
unanticipated exogenous shock in a complementary technology to
which increases in bandwidth constitute an inadequate response.
It remains quite possible that the emergence of internet video
technologies like YouTube, the development of new peer-to-peer
155 The ability of networks to reroute traffic discussed above can alleviate congestion
somewhat. See note 116 and accompanying text. But such rerouting may simply transfer
congestion in unpredictable ways, particularly when no single entity is in a position to
monitor and control the entire network. In any event, networks' ability to mitigate con-
gestion in this way is ultimately limited by total network capacity. Traffic growth will
eventually overwhelm the networks' ability to make such adjustments.
156 A dumb terminal is a device consisting solely of a keyboard and a display screen
without any independent processing capacity that depends on a mainframe or other re-
motely located computer for its processing power. In re Am Acad of Sci Tech Ctr, 367 F3d
1359, 1362 (Fed Cir 2004).
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technologies like BitTorrent, the development of complementary
technology such as faster computer chips, 157 or some other as yet
unanticipated technological change will eventually require a
similar response.
In addition, network management need not be merely a
transitional response to congestion while the network builds
more pipes. In essence, this solution requires the maintenance of
excess capacity to protect against the degradation of quality of
service during short-term traffic surges. As I have argued earlier,
building new bandwidth and network management represent
alternative responses to the problems caused by congestion. In a
world in which the relative cost of each solution is constantly
changing, there is a good argument against regarding either al-
ternative as being off the table. 158
Indeed, the FCC explicitly recognized as much when estab-
lishing a public/private partnership to govern the public safety
spectrum allocated through the 700 MHz auction. The FCC's so-
lution was to allow public safety and commercial traffic to share
bandwidth, but to give the former priority over the latter when
the network becomes congested. As the FCC noted, such priori-
tized sharing should "both help to defray the costs of build-out
and ensure that the spectrum is used efficiently."'159 This decision
acknowledged that prioritization of higher value traffic repre-
sents an effective way to lower the cost of providing service,
while at the same time representing a creative solution to extant
bandwidth limitations. Furthermore, a recent study estimated
that a network without prioritization might have to maintain up
to 60 percent more capacity than a network offering prioritized
service, assuming that links operate on average at 60 percent of
capacity and that delay-sensitive traffic represents 20 percent of
all traffic. 160
157 Michael Fitzgerald, Trying to Put New Zip into Moore's Law, NY Times 4 (Feb 24,
2008).
158 See Yoo, 19 Harv J L & Tech at 22-23, 70-71 (cited in note 22) ("[O]ne would ex-
pect that the relative costs of different types of solutions to change over time. Sometimes
increases in bandwidth would be cheaper than reliance on network management tech-
niques, and vice versa. It would thus be short-sighted to tie network managers' hands by
limiting their flexibility in their choice of network management solutions.").
159 Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands, Second Report
and Order, 22 FCC Rec 15289, 15431 396 (2007).
160 See Joseph D. Houle et al, The Evolving Internet-Traffic, Engineering, and Roles
5 (paper presented at the 35th Annual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference),
available at <http://www.cse.unr.edu/-yuksem/my-papers/2007-tprc.pdf> (last visited Apr
10, 2008).
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This is not to say that prioritization will be either easy or
perfect. Network providers may find it difficult to distinguish
between high value and low value traffic, particularly given the
strategic incentives to misrepresent the appropriate level of pri-
ority. I only seek to make the more limited point that there is no
reason to assume a priori that maintaining excess bandwidth
will always be the most cost-effective solution.
2. Prioritization as a way to promote innovation.
An alternative is to allow differential service and to raise
prices for only those end users and content and applications pro-
viders who need the enhanced services. That way the content
and applications providers who need the higher service can get
it, while those who do not need it will not have to pay more. Pri-
oritization on the internet can be analogized to the provision of
different classes of mail service. 161 Overnight mail gets there
overnight and costs roughly $10. First class mail may take as
long as two to three days and costs forty-two cents.
What would happen if regulation forced all classes of mail to
travel at the same speed? One option would be for the provider to
make everything overnight mail, in which case everyone would
have to pay more for mail service, even those who did not need
their letters and packages to arrive the next day. Another option
would be to make everything first-class mail, in which case those
who need to get items to another city overnight could not do so
even if they were willing to pay, which in turn would render
business models that depend on faster service impossible. The
provider could also split the difference and provide service that
lies somewhere in between, in which case people who need the
guarantee of truly fast service could not get what they need, and
people who were fine with first-class mail would still end up pay-
ing more than forty-two cents. The problem becomes even more
complicated once lower classes of mail service are taken into ac-
count. The more straightforward solution is to allow multiple
classes of service. That way, those and only those who need the
improved service bear the costs of the service.
This analogy underscores the mistake in arguing that creat-
ing tiers of service means that only the rich will get the fast lane.
That would make as much sense as saying that only the rich get
161 See Tim Wu and Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and
Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 Fed Comm L J 575, 578-79 (2007) (offering the same anal-
ogy).
[2008:232
179] NETWORK NEUTRALITY, CONSUMERS, AND INNOVATION 233
to use express mail. On the contrary, the rich will continue to
send some letters and packages via first class mail, while those
of lesser means will make some use of overnight mail to the ex-
tent that they can afford it. Instead, it means that only those
who need their mail to get there overnight will use overnight
mail. Creating different classes of service ensures that people
will continue to have the choice. Although the government might
intervene to ensure that end users of modest means have access
to more advanced services, as I have argued at length elsewhere,
such goals are better served by a targeted subsidy program than
an untargeted system that attempts to preserve access by enforc-
ing uniform prices across the board. 162
The internet is already employing a wide variety of ar-
rangements that guarantee quality of service, most of which are
uncontroversial. For example, virtual private networks ('VPNs")
provide dedicated bandwidth. Indeed, more than 50 percent of
VPNs guarantee some minimal level of quality of service. In-
creasingly, ISPs have begun to deviate from the traditional di-
chotomy of types of contracts (peering and transit) and have be-
gun to employ alternative arrangements, such as paid peering. 163
Although the primary explanation is asymmetry, another factor
is the desire for quality of service.
In addition, many wireless platforms have begun to use pri-
oritization techniques to compensate for the inherent bandwidth
limits and propagation characteristics of spectrum-based com-
munication. For example, some networks are attempting to lev-
erage the fact that the physics of wave propagation dictates that
the available bandwidth can vary as a person walks across the
room. 164 Some networks have begun to experiment with protocols
that give priority to latency-sensitive applications, such as VoIP,
and hold delay-tolerant applications, such as email, until the end
user reaches a location where the available bandwidth is rela-
tively large, at which point the network will download all of the
162 See Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach
to the First Amendment, 91 Georgetown L J 245, 354 (2003) (similarly arguing in the
context of television service that a direct subsidy targeted at low-income users would be
far more cost effective than an untargeted system that attempts to preserve access by
keeping prices down).
163 See note 74 and accompanying text.
164 See E.H. Choi et al., Throughput of the lx EV-DO System with Various Scheduling
Algorithms, 2004 IEEE International Symposium on Spread Spectrum Techniques and
Applications 359 (Sept 4, 2004); Jinho Hwang et al, Policy-Based QoS-Aware Packet
Scheduling for CDMA lx EV-DO (Nov 28, 2006), available at <http://cs.seas.gwu.edul
researchreports-detail.php?trnumber=TR-GWU-CS-06-005> (last visited June 12, 2008).
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email at once. 165 This is an innovative solution to a real problem.
Because those protocols discriminate on the basis of application,
it is precisely the type of solution that network neutrality would
prohibit.
Formal models indicate that allowing networks to offer pre-
mium services can stimulate innovation at the edges of the net-
work, particularly among smaller content providers. 166 The pri-
mary opponents of these changes are those industry players who
already have the most invested in the way the network is config-
ured today, as well as those innovators on the verge of entering
the market. These content and applications providers are and
will no doubt continue to be important sources of innovation. At
the same time, there are a number of other innovators whose
innovations depend on the emergence of a network with greater
capabilities. In preserving the benefits provided by the former,
policymakers should take care not to ignore the innovative po-
tential of the latter.
B. The Role of Price Signals
The flexibility to charge different content and applications
providers different prices also promotes innovation in another
way. The best way to understand this point is by focusing on the
role that prices play in signaling to others the value people place
on goods.
Allowing the prices to vary would allow network providers to
reward those content and applications providers offering higher
quality content. Indeed, such variations in pricing are quite
common in the cable television industry, a model that is becom-
ing increasingly important as Verizon's FiOS network and
AT&T's VDSL-based U-Verse network draw an increasing pro-
portion of their revenue from multichannel video. 167 Such video
165 See Hwang et al, Policy-Based QoS-Aware Packet Scheduling (cited in note 164).
166 See Jamison and Hauge, Getting What You Pay For at 15, 19 (cited in note 39)
(finding that "ftihe variety of content at the digs of the network increases when the net-
work provider optimally chooses to offer premium transmission services," that "the value
that consumers receive from the sites that purchase the premium transmission service is
greater than the value they would receive if the premium transmission service were not
offered," and that "offering premium service stimulates innovation on the edges of the
network because lower-value content sites are better able to compete with higher-value
sites with the availability of the premium service").
167 See Todd Spangler, Verizon's FiOS TV Now at 1.2 Million Subs, Multichannel
News 20 (May 5 2008) (reporting the rapid growth of FiOS TV); Saul Hansell, Wireless
Business Helps AT&T's Profit Climb 22%, NY Times C8 (Apr 23, 2008) (reporting that
AT&T added 148,000 U-Verse television customers during the first quarter of 2008 for a
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services are made possible by the fact that both Verizon and
AT&T give video programming priority over other traffic that is
less sensitive to latency. 168 The content providers offering the
highest quality and most unique content get better financial
terms than those that do not. In cable, the cash flows the other
way, with the network providers paying the content providers,
but the principle of flexibility is the same.
Conversely, the lack of pricing flexibility would dampen the
incentives for content and applications providers to innovate in
content. No matter how attractive the content provider made its
content, the price charged by the network would not vary. Al-
though the opportunities for greater revenues for advertising and
sales of other goods through the website do provide some incen-
tive, the incentive would be weaker than if content and applica-
tions providers were paid directly for content. The absence of
pricing flexibility will have a particularly strong negative impact
on programming that is intensely preferred by a small segment
of the overall audience.
In this respect, the FCC can draw on the insights from its
experience with advertising-supported television. 169 In conven-
tional markets, consumers use prices to signal the intensity of
their preferences. To use a somewhat fanciful example, suppose
that there is a group of one thousand extremely loyal fans of an
out-of-town football team living in Philadelphia. In fact, this
group is so loyal that they would each be willing to pay $10,000
each to have their games televised locally.170 If these fans are
able to pay directly for programming, they can use the intensity
of their preferences to get what they want. As a result, the pro-
gramming should appear so long as revenue of $10 million is suf-
ficient to cover the cost of televising the games to Philadelphia.
total of 379,000 subscribers and that AT&T hopes to have 1 million subscribers by the
end of the year).
168 See AT&T and BellSouth Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 FCC Rec
5662, 5814 (2007) (excluding AT&T's IPTV services from its network neutrality commit-
ment).
169 See Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52
Emory L J 1579, 1677-82 (2003) ("[Rleliance on pay television made possible the produc-
tion of programming that would not have existed had advertising support represented the
only option."); Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S Cal L Rev
669, 676-85 (2005) ("[Elfforts by Congress and the FCC to promote free [advertising-
supported] radio and television" have "had a hidden, deleterious effect on the quantity,
quality, and diversity of programming provided.").
170 In a previous paper, I built the example around a small group of opera lovers and
relegated sports fans to a footnote. See Yoo, 78 S Cal L Rev at 682-83 & n 44 (cited in
note 169). I thought it only appropriate to reverse the priority here.
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Contrast this with a world in which consumers are not al-
lowed to vary the amount that they pay for different programs,
as was the case when television was advertising supported. 171
Under advertising support, the revenue generated by program-
ming was determined by audiences' responsiveness to the adver-
tising contained in those programs. This responsiveness did not
vary much from program to program. When prices do not vary,
consumers only have one degree of freedom with which to ex-
press the intensity of their preferences: viewing versus nonview-
ing. This fact made revenue almost entirely a function of audi-
ence size, which rendered programming that appealed only to a
small audience infeasible no matter how much those viewers
would have been willing to pay for it. The relevance of this ar-
gument is demonstrated by the tremendous success of HBO,
which is able to generate more than half the revenue of CBS
even though its audience is nearly fifteen times smaller. 172 Put
another way, allowing consumers to use prices to signal the in-
tensity of their preferences directly allows HBO to generate eight
times more revenue per viewer than CBS. 173 HBO uses part of
this additional revenue to offer higher quality programming, as
demonstrated by its recent dominance of the Emmy awards. 174
At the same time, the higher revenue per customer lowers the
minimum audience size that HBO needs to break even, which in
turn makes it feasible for HBO to offer programming that ap-
peals to smaller audiences.
The television industry thus provides an example of how
enabling consumers to use prices to signal the intensity of their
preferences can promote innovation in the quality and diversity
of content. Such signals are particularly important when the
quality of the content varies widely. It thus comes as no surprise
that the magnitude of cash flows to various cable networks var-
171 When the television industry first emerged, the technology did not exist to support
pay television. When the technology needed to support direct payments for programming
was invented, the FCC regulations largely blocked the practice. It was not until the D.C.
Circuit overturned most of those regulations in 1977 that premium cable services and
other forms of pay television began to emerge. See id at 676-78 ('The hostility toward
subscription media services is also manifest in U.S. television policy. Then the develop-
ment of scrambling technology made subscription television feasible, the FCC acted fairly
quickly to stifle the industry's growth."); Yoo, 52 Emory L J at 1669-71 & n 298 (cited in
note 169) ("[Flollowing the 1977 judicial invalidation of the parallel restrictions on pay
cable ..., the FCC eventually repealed the program restrictions on [subscription televi-
sion].").
172 Yoo, 52 Emory L J at 1679-80 (cited in note 169).
173 Id.
174 Yoo, 78 S Cal L Rev at 682 (cited in note 169).
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ies widely, with those programmers offering the highest quality
and most distinctive programming faring the best and with those
offering low quality, me-too programming faring the worst. It is
these price signals that indicate to content and application pro-
viders which additional investments in developing additional
content and applications will provide the greatest consumer
value. Cutting off these price signals will make it difficult, if not
impossible, for content and applications providers to learn the
areas in which they need to make greater investments. The prob-
lem is that under the pricing regime that dominates the internet,
the fact that backbones peer with one another on a settlement-
free basis prevents such price signals from being transmitted
directly through the network. Preventing network providers from
charging content and applications providers different prices for
different levels of service would guarantee that such signals
would never be transmitted through the network itself.
Indeed, although the pricing regimes that currently domi-
nate the internet may make it seem inevitable that content and
applications providers will pay network providers, there is noth-
ing inevitable about it. The cash can flow in either direction. To
use an example again from television, in broadcasting, networks
that provided content to local television stations generally paid
those stations to carry their content. In recent years, however,
weaker stations have seen the direction of the cash flow turn
around, as the networks have begun to ask stations with weaker
signals and smaller audiences to pay instead of being paid.
That said, most observers expect the direction to remain the
same. Content providers are increasingly adopting business
models based on advertising revenue. At the same time, the net-
work providers providing the last-mile connection to content and
applications providers face far lower costs than the network pro-
viders providing the last-mile connection to end user. The former
only need to provide a high-capacity from a commercial location
to an interexchange point maintained by a backbone or a re-
gional ISP. The latter must typically establish extensive net-
works of wires and other electronics blanketing the area they
intend to serve. Since revenue is flowing into the network on the
content side and the costs are on the eyeball side, many expect
cash to flow from content networks to eyeball networks.175 As a
175 See Faratin et al, Complexity of Internet Interconnections at 13 (cited in note 73)
("[M]oney flows in at the content end ... and the content provider places more value on
the eyeball than the eyeball does on the content.").
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theoretical matter, the direction is ambiguous, and it remains
theoretically possible that the cash will flow in the other direc-
tion. Indeed, that is exactly what is happening with a new prod-
uct called ESPN 360. In that case, end users cannot get access to
ESPN 360 unless the network provider pays ESPN a fee. We
may see more of these solutions in the years to come.
The ambiguity of the direction of the cash flow raises some
question of whether the leading content and applications provid-
ers who support network neutrality might be making a mistake
and that allowing greater pricing flexibility might ultimately
work to their benefit. On the other hand, the magnitude of the
advertising revenue flowing to the content and applications pro-
viders may make it more likely that locking in prices at current
levels will ultimately redound to the benefit of content and appli-
cations providers.
The argument I am advancing does not depend on determin-
ing the precise direction and magnitude of the various cash
flows. Indeed, the dynamic nature of the underlying technology
and consumer tastes implies that both are constantly changing.
The broader point is that giving network providers greater pric-
ing flexibility might well benefit consumers by ensuring that
prices can serve as the signal that allocates resources in a more
efficient way. While insufficient to establish that such pricing
flexibility would always benefit consumers, the plausibility of
such consumer benefits represents an exemplifying theory suffi-
cient to rebut arguments in favor of categorically prohibiting
such pricing flexibility and provides strong support for permit-
ting a variety of pricing practices in the absence of any affirma-
tive showing that those practices actually harm consumers. The
possibility of exemplifying theories showing potential consumer
harm would justify a case-by-case approach rather than the type
of categorical prohibition that network neutrality proponents
seek.
C. Short-Term Deadlock As an Inevitable Part of
Economic Bargaining
Pricing mechanisms require a certain degree of give and
take if they are to function properly. New developments arise
constantly to which the market needs time to adjust. For exam-
ple, when they first arose, network providers prohibited the use
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of VPNs and home networking devices. 176 This restriction ulti-
mately proved short-lived. Consumer pressure soon induced the
network providers to change course. Although some observers
have pointed to this development as demonstrating the need to
impose network neutrality regulation, 177 I think it demonstrates
the opposite. It shows how competitive pressures and consumer
preferences revealed through individuals' purchasing decisions
can force openness in ways that render regulation unnecessary.
At times, the network providers and content and applica-
tions providers may disagree regarding the value of their prod-
ucts. Rather than jump in, regulators should allow the give and
take of the bargaining process to work its way through. The point
is illustrated by two recent examples involving the cable and sat-
ellite television industries. In both industries, broadcast stations
have a choice. They can either invoke their right to free carriage
on a cable or satellite system, or, if the broadcaster thinks they
can obtain some form of economic compensation from the cable or
satellite system, they can forego those rights and instead negoti-
ate their own carriage arrangements through arms-length nego-
tiations. 178 Most are resolved amicably enough. But sometimes,
differences of opinion about the relative value the other party is
providing and the strength of one's bargaining position can lead
to temporary deadlock.
The television stations owned by Disney/ABC had long opted
not to exercise their rights to free carriage on local cable systems
and instead opted to negotiate their own retransmission consent
agreements. Just before the retransmission consent agreement
between Disney and Time Warner Cable was to expire in Decem-
ber 1999, the parties negotiated a $1 billion follow-on agreement
that would have lasted ten years. 179 But as that deal was about
to be consummated, America Online announced its agreement to
176 For an analysis, Yoo, 94 Georgetown L J at 1856 (cited note 1) ("Other end user
restrictions included prohibitions on... engaging in home networking.. . and employing
commercial applications such as virtual private networks (VPNs).").
177 See Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in
Communications, 5 J on Telecommun & High Tech L 15, 34-35 (2006) (listing network
providers "disciplin[ing of] users of Virtual Private Networks" among the early instances
of broadband discrimination that prompted calls for network neutrality); Windhausen,
Good Fences Make Bad Broadband i, 17-18 (cited in note 13) (holding up blocking of
VPNs as an example of the type blocking or discrimination by network operators that
should be barred by network neutrality regulation).
178 See Yoo, 52 Emory L J at 1648, 1651-52 (cited in note 169) (providing an overview
of these regulatory frameworks).
179 See Harry Berkowitz, Back on the Tube: Time Warner Sets New Deadline with
Walt Disney Co., Newsday A7 (May 3 2000).
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acquire Time Warner. ABC immediately asked for a fee increase
of an additional $300 million, and Time Warner refused. 180 After
five months of short-term extensions of the previous agreement
and additional negotiations failed to yield an agreement, Time
Warner dropped all of the ABC-owned stations on May 1,
2000.181 ABC filed a complaint with the FCC the same day, and
FCC Chairman William Kennard warned that "[tihe television
sets of average consumers should never be held hostage in these
disputes" and criticized "[tihe game of brinkmanship" being
played by the parties.18 2 In the shadow of impending FCC action,
Time Warner capitulated and put the stations back on after only
one day. The FCC ruled Time Warner's actions illegal, 83 with
Chairman Kennard again warning that "[n]o company should
use consumers as pawns in a private contract dispute."'8 4 Time
Warner reached an agreement with ABC later that month, in
which ABC received the $300 million increase it sought. 185
A similar dispute arose in March 2004, when DBS provider
EchoStar was unable to reach a carriage agreement with Via-
com/CBS. EchoStar cut Viacom programming on March 9, which
left 9 million subscribers without MTV programming and 2 mil-
lion subscribers without CBS. This time the FCC followed a very
different course of action. Rather than criticizing the parties,
FCC Chairman Michael Powell simply acknowledged, "[t]hat's
what sometimes happens in the market. Consumers usually lose
180 See Bill Carter, Blackout of ABC on Cable Affects Millions of Homes, NY Times C1
(May 2, 2000).
181 See Marc Gunther, Dumb and Dumber, Fortune 140 (May 29, 2000) (describing the
dispute between Time Warner and ABC). Though Time Warner walked away from ABC,
"[tlhis isn't to say that Time Warner executives weren't provoked. Disney CEO Michael
Eisner was, in effect, greenmailing his biggest competitor, threatening to turn his lobby-
ists loose unless Time Warner agreed to pay substantially more for Disney's cable chan-
nels .. " Id.
182 Statement of FCC Chairman William E. Kennard Regarding Disney/ABC and
Time Warner Dispute (May 2, 2000), available at <http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/
KennardlStatements/2000/stwek035.html> (last visited Apr 10, 2008).
183 Time Warner Cable, Emergency Petition of ABC, Inc. for Declaratory Ruling and
Enforcement Order, 15 FCC Rec 7882 (2000) (ruling that "the removal of the ABC Sta-
tions' signals from its systems by Time Warner Cable was in violation of Section 614(b)(9)
of the Communications Act and Section 76.58 of the Commission's rules.").
184 Statement of FCC Chairman William E. Kennard on Ruling in Time Warner-
Disney Dispute (May 3, 2000), available at <http://www.fcc.gov/ZSpeehces/Kennard/
Statements/2000/stwek036.html> (last visited Mar 6, 2008).
185 Time Warner, Disney Sign Long-Term Deal, Television Digest (May 29, 2000)
(available at 2000 WLNR 4874807) ("Disney will receive about 30 percent more in com-
pensation, or roughly extra $300 million, than it would have under original $1 billion deal
.... -).
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and so do both parties. It usually doesn't happen very long."' 8 6
The parties settled the dispute two days later, largely on Via-
com's terms. Although both sides claimed victory, 18 7 the ultimate
terms were essentially what Viacom initially sought. 188
These two episodes illustrate the breathing room that is
needed if real economic bargaining is to occur. Interfering with
the give and take inherent in negotiations would eliminate the
equilibrating and incentive effects of price signals. Policymakers
must thus be careful not to regard the inability to reach agree-
ment as a definitive sign of market failure or the necessity of
government intervention. On the contrary, a certain amount of
deadlock is the sign of a properly functioning economic market.
We should be even more tolerant with respect to the inter-
net. With the increasing complexity of interconnections (for ex-
ample, secondary peering and multihoming 8 9), it is less likely
that the failure of any particular bargaining relationship will
prevent any end user from being able to access any content. In-
stead, the level of redundancy should allow them to still reach it,
although possibly at a higher cost.
D. The Role of Exclusivity
The economic literature also underscores the potential inno-
vation-enhancing effects of exclusivity arrangements. 190 Fledg-
ling new transmission platforms often rely on exclusivity ar-
rangements to make their offerings more attractive. Perhaps the
best recent demonstration of this insight is the key role that ex-
clusive access to the programming package known as NFL Sun-
day Ticket has played in helping DirecTV attract subscribers
186 Jonathan D. Salant, EchoStar, Viacom Expect Quick Resolution, Kansas City Star
C3 (Mar 11, 2004).
187 See Kris Hudson, EchoStar, Viacom Claim Win: Angry Viewers Cited as Motivating
Factor, Denver Post C1 (Mar 12, 2004) ("Both companies claimed victory on the rate is-
sue, with EchoStar saying the smaller-than-demanded increase will allow it to keep its
customers' bills low; Viacom claims it demanded a 6-cent increase all along.").
188 See Phyllis Furman, Viacom Seen Getting Best of EchoStar, NY Daily News 76
(Mar 12, 2004) ("'Wall Street immediately branded Viacom the victor, claiming its presi-
dent, Mel Karmazin, got just what he wanted from EchoStar mogul Charlie Ergen.').
189 See notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
190 See Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J L & Econ 1 (1982); Benjamin Klein,
Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Rela-
tionship Revisited, 4 J L Econ & Org 199 (1988); David Besanko and Martin K_ Perry,
Equilibrium Incentives for Exclusive Dealing in a Differentiated Products Oligopoly, 24
RAND J Econ 646 (1993); Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 Geo Mason L
Rev 673 (1999); Ilya Segal and Michael D. Whinston, Exclusive Contracts and Protection
of Investments, 31 RAND J Econ 603 (2000).
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away from cable. 191 DBS's emergence as an effective competitor
to cable has significantly improved consumer welfare. 192 Simi-
larly, a recent empirical study of the video game industry indi-
cates that exclusive access to certain hit games played a key role
in helping Microsoft's Xbox enter as a competitor in an industry
dominated by Sony's Playstation 2 and Nintendo's Gamecube. 193
The primary objection raised by network neutrality propo-
nents is that exclusivity arrangements limit consumer choice.
Exclusivity arrangements may also serve to deter entry or fore-
close rivals, which can also reduce consumer welfare. 194 The im-
pact on consumers thus depends on whether the positive or nega-
tive effects dominate.
We need not resolve this debate for the purposes of this Arti-
cle. The theoretical literature showing the possibility that exclu-
sivity can enhance consumer welfare as well as the empirical
literature indicating that those benefits have been realized in
other industries suggests that the claim is sufficiently plausible
not to prohibit exclusivity arrangements categorically, as net-
work neutrality proponents propose. Absent concrete empirical
support, exemplifying theory pointing in the other direction
would not establish that anticompetitive effects are more likely
and would only underscore the ambiguousness of the welfare cal-
culus. In so doing, it would reinforce the justifications for a case-
by-case approach rather than offer support for a blanket network
neutrality mandate.
191 Yoo, 19 Harv J L & Tech at 32 (cited in note 22).
192 See Austin Goolsbee and Ami Petrin, The Consumer Gains from Direct Broadcast
Satellites and the Competition with Cable TV, 72 Econometrica 351, 351 (2004) ("Esti-
mates of the supply response of cable suggest that without [Direct Broadcasting Satellite]
entry cable prices would be about 15 percent higher and cable quality would fall. We find
a welfare gain of between $127 and $190 per year (aggregate $2.5 billion) for satellite
buyers, and about $50 (aggregate $3 billion) for cable subscribers.").
193 See Robin S. Lee, Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided
Markets, 34 (Oct 15, 2007), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1022682> (last visited
Mar 6, 2008) (empirical study showing how exclusivity over popular games was a key
driver in promoting sales of the new Xbox gaming platform).
194 See G. Frank Mathewson and Ralph A. Winter, The Competitive Effects of Vertical
Agreements: Comment, 77 Am Econ Rev 1057 (1987) ("Exclusive dealing imposed by the
dominant manufacturer eliminates its rival from the market-exclusive dealing both
reduces actual competition and restricts the consumers' choice set."); Eric B. Rasmusen,
J. Mark Ramseyer, and John S. Wiley, Jr., Naked Exclusion, 81 Am Econ Rev 1137 (1991)
("[Mlonopolists may be able to exploit customer disorganization so as to exclude potential
rivals.'); B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston, Exclusive Dealing, 106 J Pol
Econ 64 (1998) ("We provide formal theoretical foundations for the view that exclusive
dealing may be adopted for anticompetitive reasons (to enhance market power in nonco-
incident markets).... ').
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E. The Ambiguous Role of Network Economic Effects
Network neutrality proponents argue that innovation de-
pends on content and applications providers having access to the
entire market. Absent perfect interconnectivity, they will not be
able to innovate. In effect, these arguments are either explicitly
or implicitly based on network economic effects. 195
If consumer preferences are sufficiently homogenous that all
end users effectively want the same thing from the network, the
result is standardization on a single network, and consumers and
content and applications providers all benefit from being part of
the largest network possible. A different situation obtains when
what consumers want from the network varies. As I have pointed
out in my previous work, when consumer preferences are hetero-
geneous, standardization on any particular protocol involves a
tradeoff. 196 Consider the decision faced by two groups of end us-
ers that each prefers a different network standard. A group could
adopt its preferred standard, in which case it would enjoy the
benefits of employing the standard best suited to its preferences
but would forego the benefits of being part of a larger network.
Or it could adopt the standard preferred by the other group, in
which case it would enjoy the benefits of being part of a larger
network, but would forego the benefits of employing the standard
it prefers. This is why the leading network theorists regard the
loss of product variety as one of the primary costs of standardiza-
tion. 197 These opposing considerations provide a basis for deter-
195 See Lessig, Future of Ideas at 171 (cited in note 14) ("eBay benefits greatly from a
network that is open and where access is free. It is this general feature of the Net that
makes the Net so valuable to users and a source of innovation. And to the extent that
individual sites begin to impose their own rules of exclusion, the value of the network as a
network declines."); Jerry A. Hausman et al, Residential Demand for Broadband Tele-
communications and Consumer Access to Unaffiliated Internet Content Providers, 18 Yale
J Reg 129, 161-62, 163-65 (2001) (arguing that "[t]he academic literature on ... network
externalities provides theoretical and empirical support for the conjecture that AT&T
could impose proprietary standards that would raise the switching costs for its subscrib-
ers and stifle competition in vertically related software markets" and that once estab-
lished, "the early leader in any broadband Internet access may enjoy a 'lock-in' of custom-
ers and content providers"); Wu, 2 J on Telecommun & High Tech L at 151 (cited in note
106) ("If broadband operators were to ban IP chat programs, other network applications,
like file-exchange programs, may be hurt. Applications that depend on a critical mass of
users may also be hurt if users will not pay for broadband when chat programs are not
available.").
196 Yoo, 19 Harv J L & Tech at 34-36 (cited in note 22) (showing how standardization
involves a tradeoff between the benefits of consuming a product incorporating a con-
sumer's preferred standard and the benefits of belonging to a larger network).
197 Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J
Econ Perspesctives 93, 110 (1994) (noting that "the primary cost of standardization is loss
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mining the optimal level of variety. Where the market will reach
equilibrium depends on whether the benefits from being part of a
larger network dominate the benefits from employing the stan-
dard best suited to a particular group's preferences or vice
versa. 198
The ultimate ambiguity of arguments based on network eco-
nomic effects is demonstrated by how the network neutrality de-
bate inverts the usual economic arguments. The usual argument
is that once markets become "tipped," network economic effects
cause markets to become locked into the technologies long after
they have become obsolete. This is because new technologies are
unable to generate sufficient critical mass to displace the exist-
ing technology. The concern is that network participants will be-
come too reluctant to innovate away from the standard that cur-
rently dominates. On this logic, the concern should be that the
internet is a tipped market that has become locked in to an obso-
lete technology.199 If so, policymakers should encourage, rather
than discourage, network players to experiment with deviations
from the current standard.
Network neutrality proponents take precisely the opposite
position by advocating that all network operators maintain per-
fect interoperability, presumably on the current standard. There
is no theoretical justification for such a position. The economic
literature suggests that it is just as possible for markets subject
to network economic effects to exhibit "excess momentum" as
well as "excess inertia. '200 As a theoretical matter, it is possible
for network providers to be too eager to deviate from the current
of variety: consumers have fewer differentiated products to pick from"); Joseph Farrell
and Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J Econ 70,
71 (1985) (counting "reduction in variety" as one of the "important social costs" of stan-
dardization).
198 See Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner, Standardization and Variety, 20 Econ Let-
ters 71 (1986) (offering a simple formal model capturing this tradeoff). Frischmann and
van Schewick assert that some of the productive activities in which internet users engage
when using the internet generates social benefits that market transactions do not take
into account. As I have noted earlier, it is impossible to determine a priori whether any
such positive externalities are creating systematic underproduction or instead they are
offset by countervailing negative externalities. See note 103.
199 Indeed, some leading technologists have suggested that TCP/IP may be obsolete.
See Carol Wilson, Point of No Return, Telephony (Apr 3, 2006), available at
<http:/Iblog.tmcnet.comlblog/rich-tehranilvoip/point-of-no-return.html> (last visited May
9, 2008) (quoting former FCC Chief Technologist and Carnegie Mellon Professor David
Farber that the internet is "getting old" and needs new functionality, especially to handle
new services such as video).
200 See Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innova-
tion, Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 Am Econ Rev 940, 942 (1986); Katz
and Shapiro, 94 J Pol Econ 822 (cited in note 139).
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standard, in which case requiring them to adhere to the current
standard might benefit consumers. It is also possible for network
providers to be too reluctant to deviate from the current stan-
dard, in which case experimentation with different protocols
should be encouraged. Indeed, to the extent that markets are
subject to excess inertia, formal models indicate that competition
between a proprietary and a nonproprietary standard or between
two proprietary standards may compensate (or even overcom-
pensate) for inefficiencies in technology adoption caused by net-
work economic effects. 201 There is no theoretical reason a priori
to pick one over the other, and the extant empirical evidence
tends to contradict claims that network economic effects cause
inefficient technology adoption decisions. 202
IV. NETWORK DIVERSITY As AN APPROPRIATE MIDDLE GROUND
WHEN THE IMPACT ON CONSUMERS AND INNOVATION IS
AMBIGUOUS
The preceding Parts have shown ways in which deviating
from network neutrality might benefit consumers by reducing
the congestion costs and by creating flexible pricing regimes that
increase aggregate consumer welfare. They have also shown
ways in which deviating from network neutrality might promote
innovation by deploying innovative new protocols, using prices to
provide incentives to create new content and applications, and by
facilitating entry by new transmission platforms. The question is
what policy inferences should be drawn from these facts?
As I have argued at length elsewhere, I believe that the Su-
preme Court's antitrust jurisprudence provides a useful frame-
work for answering this question.20 3 Turning to antitrust law,
and in particular the law on vertical restraints, is particularly
appropriate because the concern is analytically the same as the
concern motivating network neutrality proponents: that a firm
operating at one level of a chain of production will exercise its
201 See Katz and Shapiro, 94 J Pol Econ at 835, 838-39 (cited in note 139) (showing
how competition between a proprietary and a nonproprietary standard or between two
nonproprietary standards can compensate for the tendency toward inefficient nonstan-
dardization associated with competition between two nonproprietary standards); Michael
L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Product Introduction with Network Externalities, 40 J Indus
Econ 55, 73 (1992).
202 See Spulber and Yoo, 88 Cornell L Rev at 930-31 (cited in note 84).
203 See Christopher S. Yoo, What Can Antitrust Contribute to the Network Neutrality
Debate, 1 Intl J Comm 493, 508-17 (2007) (reviewing the implications of antitrust law for
the network neutrality debate); Yoo, 19 Harv J L & Tech at 69-70 (cited in note 22)
(same).
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market power to reduce the competitiveness of an adjacent level
of production.
The Supreme Court restated the law governing vertical re-
straints in State Oil Co v Khan,20 4 in which the Court recognized
that "most antitrust claims are analyzed under a 'rule of rea-
son,"' under which courts evaluate the competitive impact of a
particular practice on a case-by-case basis in light of all of the
facts. 20 5 If, however, a court has sufficient experience with a par-
ticular vertical restraint to conclude with confidence that it
evinces "such predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect,
and such limited potential for procompetitive benefit" that noth-
ing would be lost by prohibiting it without any detailed inquiry
into the specific facts, it should be categorically prohibited and
declared illegal per se. 20 6 If, on the other hand, "the economic
impact of [the challenged] practices [are] not immediately obvi-
ous," courts should refrain from imposing a per se rule and con-
tinue to apply the rule of reason. 207
The Court reiterated these same principles just last year in
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc.20 8 The Court
began by noting, "[t]he rule of reason is the accepted standard for
testing whether a practice restrains trade in violation of' the an-
titrust laws and that courts should declare a practice illegal per
se only if it evinces "'manifestly anticompetitive"' effects and a
"'lack [of] any redeeming virtue.' 20 9 The Court continued:
As a consequence, the per se rule is appropriate only after
courts have had considerable experience with the type of
restraint at issue and only if courts can predict with con-
fidence that it would be invalidated in all or almost all in-
stances under the rule of reason. It should come as no
surprise, then, that 'we have expressed reluctance to
adopt per se rules with regard to restraints imposed in the
context of business relationships where the economic im-
pact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.' And,
as we have stated, a "departure from the rule-of-reason
204 522 US 3 (1997).
205 Id at 10.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 127 S Ct 2705 (2007).
209 Id at 2712, quoting Continental TV, Inc v GTE Sylvania, Inc, 433 US 36, 50 (1977);
and Nw Wholesale Stationers, Inc v Pac Stationery & Printing Co, 472 US 284, 289
(1985).
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standard must be based upon demonstrable economic ef-
fect .... "210
The analytical framework implicit in this approach is clear:
if a practice is always harmful (or so nearly always harmful that
any inquiry into its competitive impact would likely prove fruit-
less), the practice should be categorically prohibited. Conversely,
if a practice is always or nearly always beneficial, it should al-
ways be categorically declared legal, as indeed some Chicago
School theorists once advocated with respect to vertical re-
straints. 211 If the precise competitive impact of a practice is as-
yet unclear, or if it is theoretically possible for a practice to be
harmful in some instances and beneficial in others, its precise
competitive effect should be determined through an ex post, case-
by-case analysis.
Applying this framework to the network neutrality debate
provides a powerful argument against mandating network neu-
trality. The adoption of network neutrality regulations would be
tantamount to declaring practices that deviate from network
neutrality illegal per se. In the absence of a clear indication of
what the competitive impact of practices deviating from network
neutrality might be, those practices are better analyzed under
the type of ex post, case-by-case approach that characterizes the
rule of reason rather than the ex ante, categorical approach that
characterizes per se illegality.
To justify their calls for a more categorical approach, net-
work neutrality proponents invoke a series of exemplifying theo-
ries showing the existence of circumstances under which exclu-
sionary practices can harm consumers. 212 For the most part,
these theories are based on the game theoretic models that char-
acterize the post-Chicago economic literature. 213
Commentators on the post-Chicago literature, both sympa-
thetic and skeptical, have long recognized that these game theo-
retic models depend on highly restrictive assumptions in order to
yield results. 214 Ensuring that these preconditions are met is
210 Id (quoting Khan, 522 US at 10; and Sylvania, 433 US at 58-59).
211 See note 26 and accompanying text.
212 Van Schewick, 5 J on Telecommun & High Tech L at 340-78 (cited in note 15);
Frischmann and van Schewick, 47 Jurimetrics J at 412-20 (cited in note 12).
213 Joseph Farrell and Michael L. Katz, Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration
in Systems Markets, 48 J Indus Econ 413 (2000); Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclo-
sure, and Exclusion, 80 Am Econ Rev 837 (1990).
214 See Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 Stan L Rev 1291, 1310-11 (1990)
(noting the tendency of game theoretic models to yield no equilibria or multiple equilibria
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made all the more essential by a key aspect of game theory that
makes its results less robust than traditional economic analyses.
In neoclassical economics, small changes to the empirical pa-
rameters underlying the model lead only to small changes in the
underlying equilibrium. The equilibria in game theoretic models,
in contrast, are quite sensitive to changes in assumptions and
often exhibit large, discontinuous changes to small changes to
the underlying parameters. 215 Thus, before drawing any infer-
ences, policymakers must be careful that all of the factual predi-
cates of each model are satisfied, 216 even though those facts are
often very difficult to verify. 217
Even more fundamentally, the game theoretic models at is-
sue here make no attempt to formalize the overall impact on con-
sumer welfare, either by offering a metric for determining opti-
mal innovation or by taking into account potential efficiencies.
The problem is that these models assume precisely the type of
market structure that is likely to give rise to these efficiencies. 21 8
without restrictive assumptions); Robert 0. Keohane, Rational Choice Theory and Inter-
national Law: Insights and Limitations, 31 J Legal Stud S307, S314 (2002) (noting that
the well-known Folk Theorem indicates "that strict game-theoretic analysis, without
restrictive assumptions, typically predicts multiple equilibria, sometimes involving cy-
cling between different states of the world"); Interview with Dennis A. Yao, Former FTC
Commissioner, Antitrust 12, 16 (Fall 1994) (observing that "[g]ame-theoretic models
generally become unwieldy unless they adopt restrictive assumptions").
215 Ayres, 42 Stan L Rev at 1313-14 (cited in note 214).
216 Id at 1317 (observing that "particularized games are not neatly applicable to a
broad spectrum of markets" and how the existence of "a number of 'possibility' theorems
... force both sides toward empirical analysis"); Interview with Dennis A. Yao, Antitrust
at 16 (cited in note 214) (noting the importance of ensuring that the restrictive assump-
tions needed to produce game theoretic results are "descriptive or reality").
217 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich L Rev 213, 261 (1985)
(noting that the factual issues central to post-Chicago theory may be "too complex to be
dealt with in antitrust litigation" and acknowledging then-Chief Judge Breyer's conclu-
sion that anticompetitive strategic behavior exists but is too complex for courts to sort out
(citing Barry Wright Corp v ITT Grinnell Corp, 724 F2d 227, 230-36 (1st Cir 1983)));
Keith N. Hylton and Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision-Theoretic Ap-
proach, 69 Antitrust L J 469, 470 (2001) ("Mhe game theory underpinning the literature
rests on highly stylized assumptions that are difficult to apply to the factual settings
courts confront."); Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust
Economics, 74 NC L Rev 219, 254 (1995) ("Moreover, many post-Chicago theories are
constructed so restrictively ... that testing them is unproductive. Others depend on
speculation about the reputational effects of apparently irrational strategic behavior ...
making empirical validation impossible.").
218 Hylton and Salinger, 69 Antitrust L J at 471 (cited in note 217) ("[The most plau-
sible post-Chicago theory of anticompetitive tying is based on the assumption that the
tying and tied goods are complementary and that they are both susceptible to market
power and, indeed, monopoly. It is a long-established principle of economics, however,
that integrated complementary monopoly results in lower prices than distinct comple-
mentary monopolies. A public policy that imparts a bias toward interdependent comple-
mentary monopolies instead of integrated complementary monopolies has the predictable
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A brief review of some of the models invoked by network
neutrality proponents will help illustrate my point. Consider first
Michael Whinston's seminal tying model. 219 Whinston effectively
rebutted calls to treat tying as legal per se 220 by showing the ex-
istence of circumstances under which tying can be profitable and
can exclude competitors. Whinston's base model turns on three
key factual assumptions. First, it assumes that the firm engag-
ing in the exclusionary conduct is a monopolist in one market,
called the primary market, A, which consists of am potential buy-
ers. Second, it assumes the existence of a market for a comple-
mentary product, B. Although everyone who purchases A also
purchases B, there are also consumers who purchase only B, but
not A. Third, the market for B must be characterized by econo-
mies of scale and that the minimum efficient scale for B must be
larger than the number of B consumers who do not purchase A.
If the A monopolist does not tie its product to B, it can only
exercise monopoly power over the number of consumers who pur-
chase A (am). If, on the other hand, the A monopolist forces all B
consumers who also purchase A (bin) to purchase from it by tying
A to B, it can increase its profits by foreclosing the market for B.
If the minimum efficient scale (s) is larger than the number of
consumers who buy only B (bi), any independent producer of B
will operate at a cost disadvantage versus the A monopolist and
will not be able to compete. This in turn allows the A monopolist
to drive all independent producers of B out of the market and to
exercise market power over all B consumers (including both b.
and bi) and not just those who also purchase A (bin). In this man-
ner, the A monopolist can exclude rival producers of B and
thereby increase the number of consumers over which it can ex-
ert monopoly power.
consequence of raising prices and reducing consumer welfare.'); Edward A. Snyder and
Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 Mich L Rev
551, 589-91 (1991) (tracing the potential efficiency benefits and noting that "meeting the
necessary conditions for anticompetitive exclusion is likely to ensure that some efficiency
benefits are realized from the business practices I question.").
219 Whinston, 80 Am Econ Rev at 837 (cited in note 213), cited in van Schewick, 5 J on
Telecommun & High Tech L at 342-52 (cited in note 15); and Frischmann and van
Schewick, 47 Jurimetrics J at 412-14 (cited in note 12).
220 See, for example, Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 380 (Free Press 1978)
("[A] logically consistent law would have to accept the legality of all tying arrange-
ments ... ").
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FIGURE 6: A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE OF MICHAEL WHINSTON'S
THEORY OF TYING
Monopoly Case
Market for A
a. = 60 units
Market for B
b. a. z60 units bi=20 units
Minimum efficient scale (s) =
25
Duopoly Case
Market for A
a, = 30 units a2 = 30 units
Market for B
b, = 30 units b available for competitor = 50 units
Minimum efficient scale (s) = 25
The following numerical example may help illustrate the in-
tuitions underlying Whinston's model. Suppose that the market
for good A is 60 units and that that market is dominated by a
monopolist. Suppose further that all 60 people who purchase
good A also purchase good B, and there are 20 other consumers
who only purchase good B. Whinston pointed out that if mini-
mum efficient scale for producing B is greater than 20 units (say
25 units), the A monopolist can obtain a monopoly in the market
for B simply by tying A and B together. This is because tying A
and B only leaves 20 uncommitted consumers of B. Because the
minimum efficient scale for producing B is greater than 20, every
other potential producer of B will operate at a cost disadvantage
in B production vis-A-vis the monopolist and thus will be unable
to compete effectively. This allows the producer of A to exercise
monopoly power over not only the 60 consumers who purchase
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both A and B, but also the 20 additional consumers who pur-
chase only B.
A close analysis of the model reveals how much its results
depend on its assumptions. Consider first the fact that the model
depends on a very precise relationship between the number of
consumers who purchase only B (bi) and the minimum efficient
scale for producing B (s). The model strictly requires that s > bi.
This is because the A monopolist can only tie up those B consum-
ers who also purchase A. If the number of consumers that pur-
chase only B exceeds the minimum efficient scale for producing B
(that is, if s < bi), a rival producer of B will not operate at a cost
disadvantage and will not be driven from the market. Thus,
Whinston's model in effect requires that the number of consum-
ers who purchase only B (bi) be relatively small and that the
minimum efficient scale for producing B (s) be relatively large.
Any deviation from this relationship prevents the effect that
Whinston has identified from materializing.
In the context of network neutrality, the primary market is
the market for last-mile internet access, and the secondary mar-
ket is the market for content and applications. This raises the
empirical questions of (1) whether there are consumers of inter-
net content and applications who do not also purchase internet
access services and (2) how large is the minimum efficient scale
for providing internet content and applications. Note also that
the number of consumers of internet content and applications
who do not also purchase internet access services must be small
relative to minimum efficient scale; otherwise the effect that
Whinston identifies will not arise.
Network neutrality proponents assert that the first condi-
tion is met (that is, there are consumers of internet content and
applications who do not also purchase internet access services)
because the market for internet access is local. For example, the
relevant market for last-mile internet services to my home is the
city of Philadelphia, which for the time being we shall assume is
a monopoly. The existence of consumers in other cities outside of
Philadelphia represent consumers of the secondary good (inter-
net content and applications) who do not also consume the pri-
mary good (last-mile internet access in Philadelphia).
I have long suggested that the relevant market for internet
content and applications is national, not local. As I noted else-
where:
Major web-based providers, such as Amazon.com or eBay,
are focused more on the total number of customers they
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are able to reach nationwide than they are on their ability
to reach customers located in any specific metropolitan
area. The fact that they may be unable to reach certain
customers is of no greater concern, however, than the fact
that manufacturers of particular brands of cars, shoes, or
other conventional goods are not always able to gain dis-
tribution in all parts of the country.... The proper ques-
tion is thus not whether the broadband transport provider
wields market power vis-a-vis broadband users in any
particular city, but rather whether that provider has
market power in the national market for obtaining broad-
band content. In short, it is national reach, not local
reach, that matters. 221
Some network neutrality proponents assert that customers'
interest in local news and local yellow pages is enough to render
the relevant geographic market local. 222 Although that observa-
tion is true as far as it goes, acknowledging that the proper geo-
graphic scope for a small number websites is local does not un-
dercut the fact that the relevant geographic market for the vast
majority of websites and applications is national rather than lo-
cal. 223 If so, it is not clear whether there is any residuum of pur-
chasers of B (internet content and applications) who do not also
purchase A (last-mile internet services).
But even if one were to accept the assertions of network neu-
trality proponents and assume that the relevant market is local,
that would render the Whinston model inapposite. This is be-
cause leverage under the Whinston model is impossible if the
number of consumers who purchase B without also purchasing A
is relatively small. If not, the large number of uncommitted con-
sumers of B makes it easy for independent purchasers of B to
achieve minimum efficient scale. If the relevant market is local,
the number of consumers who purchase B without purchasing A
(in the example above, the number of consumers of internet con-
tent and applications outside of Philadelphia) will be very large,
which renders it increasingly unlikely that this will exceed the
economies of scale.
221 Yoo, 19 Harv J L & Tech at 72-73 (cited in note 22); accord Yoo, 94 Georgetown L J
at 1892-93 (cited in note 1); Yoo, 3 J on Telecommun & High Tech L at 52 (cited in note
34); Yoo, 19 Yale J Reg at 254 (cited in note 25).
222 See Frischmann and van Schewick, 47 Jurimetrics J at 412-16 (cited in note 12).
223 See Yoo, 52 Emory L J at 1657-58 (cited in note 169) (making a similar point in
the context of local-interest vs. national-interest television).
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Consider next the assumption that the market for B (inter-
net content and applications) is characterized by large economies
of scale. The fact that most content and applications markets
have not collapsed into natural monopolies suggests either that
the scale economies created by fixed costs are particularly lar-
ge 224 or that there is some other consideration, such as conges-
tion costs 225 or product differentiation, 226 that serves to counter-
balance the scale economies. 227 Indeed, the high fixed costs asso-
ciated with other content-oriented industries, such as television,
have not created scale economies so large as to prevent those
markets from functioning properly. 228
Finally, we come to the prerequisite that the market is a
monopoly. 229 This is a very strong assumption in the model, as
can be seen if one instead explores what happens if this assump-
tion is relaxed only slightly and the market for A is assumed to
be a duopoly. If the market is a duopoly with two firms dividing
the A market into two segments (al and a2), it is impossible for
the producer of al to use tying to exert any leverage over the
224 As I noted earlier, the scale economies associated with high fixed costs decays
exponentially as volume increases. See note 121. Thus, even when scale economies re-
main unexhausted in the strict sense, as volume increases they eventually become so
small and the average cost curve becomes so flat as to no longer confer any competitive
advantage. At most, it would allow the dominant player to engage in a very weak form of
limit pricing that was only slightly above competitive levels, in which case the consumer
harm would be miniscule.
225 See Yoo, 155 U Pa L Rev at 678-80 (cited in note 103) (showing how congestion
costs can prevent markets from collapsing into natural monopolies despite unexhausted
economies of scale).
226 See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 NYU L Rev 212,
248-49 (2004) (explaining how product differentiation can prevent markets from collaps-
ing into natural monopolies despite unexhausted economies of scale).
227 There may be particular internet services for which this may not be true. For ex-
ample, auction sites that depend on bringing together large numbers of buyers and sellers
may exhibit a degree of demand-side scale economies. In addition, search engines and
other regimes that learn from the participation of other users may also exhibit the same
quality. Whether these advantages are sufficiently large to offset any accompanying dis-
economies of scale and confer a competitive advantage is an empirical question that can-
not be answered a priori. The existence of such providers would not, however, support a
blanket network neutrality rule covering all content and applications. It would instead
simply support a narrow rule targeted only at content and applications for which this
effect holds true.
228 See Implementation of Section 11(c) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992, Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rec 19098, 19115-16
41-42 (1999) (estimating minimum efficient scale for cable television programming at 15
million homes or 18.56 percent of the market); Yoo, 52 Emory L J at 1603-07 (cited in
note 169) (showing how product differentiation can offset scale economies created by high
fixed costs).
229 Whinston also analyzes a scenario in which the tying firm faces competition from
an inferior provider. Whinston, 80 Am Econ Rev at 852-54 (cited in note 213). Network
neutrality proponents do not appear to rely on this particular scenario.
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market for B. This is because any independent producer would
be able to compete for not only the B consumers who did not also
purchase A (bi), but also B customers who purchased A from the
firm that did not tie (b2). In the numerical example given above,
if we assume that the duopolists divide the market equally, an
independent producers would have available to it not only the 20
consumers who purchase only B, but also the 30 consumers who
purchase both A and B, but did not purchase A from the tying
firm. Any independent producer of B would have an open market
of 50 units, a number well in excess of the minimum efficient
scale. One could posit that the duopolists divide the market un-
evenly, but in that case one firm would have to control roughly
92 percent of market A (55/60 units) before it could exert any
unilateral leverage over market B. Alternatively, one could in-
stead posit that the minimum efficient scale might be 50 units.
Although this would make leverage feasible, the fact that mini-
mum efficient scale exceeded half of the market would also imply
that market B was already a natural monopoly, in which case not
only would the market not be a duopoly: tying the two products
together would create efficiencies by eliminating double margin-
alization. 230 Of course, both duopolists could engage in tying,
which would exclude independent producers. But if so, the du-
opolists would still engage in a degree of competition for consum-
ers who do not also purchase A (bi). Thus, whether the duopolists
would be able to profit by this depends on the conjectures about
duopoly pricing.
The assumption that the market is a monopoly is thus a
strong one that drives much of Whinston's result. If the proper
geographic market is national, this assumption is clearly not
met, as no provider would control more than 22 percent of the
market. 231 Moreover, the assumption does not hold even if the
relevant geographic market is assumed to be local. Published
reports indicate that DSL is available over 80 percent of all
households that can receive phone service and that cable modem
service is available in over 96 percent of households that can re-
ceive cable television service. 232 Given the near ubiquity of both
230 See Spulber and Yoo, 107 Colum L Rev at 1838-39 & n 72 (cited in note 21) (col-
lecting sources showing how integration between successive monopolies, successive mo-
nopoly and oligopoly, and successive oligopolies enhances consumer welfare).
231 See Yoo, 1 Intl J Comm at 514 (cited in note 203).
232 Fed Communications Commission, Industry Analysis and Technology Division,
High-Speed Services of Internet Access: Status as of June 30, 2007, at 3 (Mar 2008),
available at <http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-280906Al.pdf> (last
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telephone and cable service, these numbers suggest that roughly
80 percent of the nation is served by at least two last-mile broad-
band internet providers. 233 The rapid growth of wireless as a
broadband platform promises to increase the competitiveness of
this space still further.234 The Whinston model by itself thus pro-
vides only weak support for a network neutrality mandate. Even
under the most expansive approach to market definition, the
prerequisite that the market be a monopoly limits it to at most
20 percent of the country. The other preconditions limit it still
further.
The foregoing discussion highlights the narrowness of the
factual preconditions that must be satisfied for Whinston's model
to apply. It is for this reason that Stan Liebowitz and Stephen
Margolis call Whinston's theory an example of the "Goldilocks
theory of tie-in sales."235 Simply put, everything must be just
right for anticompetitive effects that Whinston identified to
arise. As such, it is a classic example of exemplifying theory. 236
Even more importantly, Whinston acknowledges that his model
does not consider whether tying might give rise to efficiencies.
Thus, Whinston himself cautioned that his model would not sup-
port the broad per se rules. 237
This is not to understate Whinston's contribution. His work
represents perhaps the most important exemplifying theory used
to rebut Chicago School scholars' calls for treating tying as per se
legal. At the same time, it would be a mistake to attempt to use
Whinston's theory as the basis for an argument in favor of a per
visited May 9, 2008); Leicthman Research Group, Inc., Research Notes 1Q 2008, at 5,
available at <http://www.leichtmanresearch.com/research/notes03_2008.pdf> (last visited
May 27, 2008) (reporting that broadband internet is available in 89 percent of homes
passed by telephone wires and 99 percent of homes passed by cable television wires). See
also National Cable and Telecommunication Association, Industry Statistics, available at
<http://www.ncta.com/Statistic/StatisticStatistics.aspx> (last visited May 27, 2008) (re-
porting that 117.7 million of 123.4 million houses in which cable television is available
can receive cable modem service or roughly 95.4 percent).
233 See Alfred E. Kahn, Telecommunications: The Transition from Regulation to Anti-
trust, 5 J on Telecommun & High Tech L 159, 160 n 2 (2006) (performing a similar esti-
mate based on earlier data).
234 Federal Communications Commission, High-Speed Services of Internet Access tbl
1 (cited in note 232) (indicating that wireless has skyrocketed from having no subscribers
as of the beginning on of 2005 to controlling 35 million subscribers and 35 percent of the
market for high-speed lines as of June 2007).
235 Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, Bundles of Joy: The Ubiquity and
Efficiency of Bundles in New Technology Markets 10 (Dec 2007), available at <http://
ssrn.comabstract=1069421> (last visited Mar 6, 2008).
236 See Hylton and Salinger, 69 Antitrust L J at 497 (cited in note 217) (describing
Whinston's model as an exemplifying theory).
237 See Whinston, 80 Am Econ Rev at 855-56 (cited in note 213).
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se rule cutting in the opposite direction. As noted above, a rule
declaring tying illegal per se would depend on a showing that the
practice nearly always harms consumers. Whinston's analysis is
an exemplifying theory that simply identifies one set of circum-
stances in which tying could harm consumers without making
any attempt to determine the frequency with which tying would
actually harm consumers.
Consider next the systems integration model by Joseph Far-
rell and Michael Katz.238 Farrell and Katz examine markets in
which consumers buy two components of a system (such as a
computer and a monitor) and in which one producer has a mo-
nopoly over one component and competes in the market for the
other component not only in terms of price, but also in terms of
research and development ("R&D"), which provides competitive
advantages in the market for the other component by increasing
the quality of the version offered.
Farrell and Katz show that the producer of the monopoly
component will invest more in R&D if it integrates into printers
than would a stand-alone producer of printers. The reason is that
the monopolist has the incentive to induce producers of the other
component to offer consumers as much surplus as possible. This
in turn allows the monopolist to extract that surplus in the price
it charges for the other component. 239 The effect of integration is
to raise the monopolist's investment in R&D. 240 Integration may
also lower competitors' incentives to invest in R&D. 241
This model is subject to a number of limitations. As an ini-
tial matter, like the Whinston model, it requires the existence of
a monopoly in the primary market. In addition, the welfare im-
plications are subject to more than one interpretation. The wel-
fare losses result from the increase in R&D by the monopolist
and the decrease in R&D by competitors. The welfare impact of
increases in R&D by the monopolist is difficult to interpret. In
general, larger investments in R&D are procompetitive. 242 In-
deed, determining whether the investments in R&D undertaken
by the monopolist are excessive requires some measure of opti-
mal R&D investment as well as an assessment of whether there
are inefficiencies pointing in the other direction stemming from
238 Farrell and Katz, 48 J Indus Econ at 413 (cited in note 213), cited by van Schewick,
5 J on Telecommun & High Tech L at 343 n 45 (cited in note 15).
239 Farrell and Katz, 48 J Indus Econ at 414 (cited in note 213).
240 Id at 419.
241 Id at 420-21.
242 Hylton and Salinger, 69 Antitrust L J at 496 (cited in note 217).
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firms' well-recognized inability to internalize the full benefits
created by their R&D investments. 243 Nor is it inevitable that
systems integration will cause competitors' investment incen-
tives to fall. Although the increase in investments by the mo-
nopolist may cause the competitors to lower their own invest-
ments, it may well cause them to attempt to compete with the
monopolist by increasing their investments instead.244 The de-
pendence on the underlying factual assumptions and the ambi-
guity of the welfare implications of the equilibria dictate that the
Farrell and Katz model be regarded as another exemplifying the-
ory suggesting that anticompetitive consequences may arise
without providing any insight into how likely they are to occur. 245
Other theories advanced in support of network neutrality
depend on the assumption that the market for internet access
services is dominated by a single, national firm. 246 Network neu-
trality proponents offer a number of other exemplifying theories,
including (most intriguingly) models that do not depend on the
assumption that the last-mile internet access provider is a mo-
nopolist. 247 Unfortunately, these models are sketched only briefly
and are too incompletely specified to permit rigorous analysis of
the market features that give rise to these effects.
The existence of multiple exemplifying theories strengthens
the case for a broad, ex ante network neutrality mandate, but
only slightly. The problem is that there is no concrete evidence
that the restrictive assumptions of any particular theory have
been satisfied. In addition, as I have attempted to show in my
work, there are also a substantial number of equally plausible
exemplifying theories pointing in the other direction. Absent
some compelling empirical reason to presume that one group is
more likely than the other, core principles of competition policy
support eschewing broad categorical solutions in either direction
and instead subjecting such practices to case-by-case analysis.
The only remaining question is which way to put the burden
of proof. The real impact of the burden of proof is on what will
happen in ambiguous cases, in which the firm adopting a prac-
tice cannot prove whether the practice will be harmful or benefi-
243 Id (citing Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 389-401 (MIT 1988)).
244 Id.
245 Id at 497.
246 Gerald Faulhaber, Network Effects and Merger Analysis: Instant Messaging and
the AOL-Time Warner Case, 26 Telecommun Pol 311 (2002), cited in van Schewick, 5 J on
Telecommun & High Tech L at 347 & n 58 (cited in note 15).
247 Van Schewick, 5 J on Telecommun & High Tech L at 368-77 (cited in note 15).
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cial. If the burden rests on the party advancing the new practice,
ambiguous practices will not be permitted to go forward. If the
burden rests on the party opposing the new practice, ambiguous
cases will be permitted to go forward.
The need to preserve businesses' ability to experiment with
new business models favors placing the burden on those opposing
the practice. The need to preserve this room for experimentation
is underscored still further by the difficulty in determining which
business models will ultimately succeed. Perhaps the most dra-
matic example of this problem is America Online's acquisition of
Time Warner. It is hard to understate the furor that surrounded
the merger. At $165 billion, it was by far the biggest merger the
world had ever seen at that time. People talked about the merger
as if it were the end of history, warning that the combination of
content and conduit would eliminate the openness that charac-
terized the internet and force all broadband users into AOL's
"walled garden. ' 248
Time would ultimately render all of these dire warnings
moot. AOL was forced to adapt to the internet, instead of the
other way around. After initially attempting to keep its users
within its world, AOL soon capitulated and gave its users free
access to the entire internet. Thus, AOL went down the same
path as CompuServe, Prodigy, and numerous others ISPs who
attempted to focus on proprietary content. Rather than enabling
the combined entity to force proprietary content down consum-
ers' throats, the merger simply enabled Time Warner sharehold-
ers to lose approximately $200 billion in value. 249 The final ac-
knowledgement of failure came in February 2008, when Time
Warner announced that it was separating its America Online's
internet-access business from its web-portal and advertising
businesses in apparent preparation to divesting both. 250
248 See, for example, Frangois Bar et al, Access and Innovation Policy for the Third-
Generation Internet, 24 Telecomm Pol 489 (2000); Mark A. Lemley and Lawrence Lessig,
The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era,
48 UCLA L Rev 925 (2001); Daniel L. Rubinfeld and Hal J. Singer, Open Access to Broad-
band Networks: A Case Study of the AOL/Time Warner Merger, 16 Berkeley Tech L J 631
(2001).
249 See Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Pri-
macy, 31 J Corp L 975, 975, 999 (2006) (estimating that the merger cost shareholders
over $200 billion in value in just three years).
250 See Merissa Marr, Time Warner's CEO Spells Out Changes, Wall St J A3 (Feb 7,
2008) ("Mr. Bewkes, who succeeded Richard Parsons in the top job [at Time Warner] at
the start of the year, also confirmed he is separating AOL's shrinking Internet-access
operation from its Web-portal and advertising business. Such a move could pave the way
for the divestiture of both businesses.").
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My point is not to engage in 20/20 hindsight. Rather, my
point is that the brightest minds in the world find it difficult to
predict which business models will succeed and which will fail.
These difficulties suggest that policymakers should hesitate be-
fore adopting regulations that rule any particular business model
off the table. The better course would be to give providers the
latitude to experiment with a wide range of business strategies
and to forego intervening until a particular strategy proves to be
harmful to consumers.
My point is illustrated by the following hypothetical. Sup-
pose that a community were served by four last-mile broadband
providers. Suppose further that one of them would like to deploy
a proprietary protocol that allows it to give certain applications
priority over others, enter into exclusivity arrangement with par-
ticular content providers, or make some other change that ren-
ders its network imperfectly interoperable with the others' net-
works. There are three possible outcomes. First, the network
that would like to make the change may have found a better
business model, in which case society would be better off if the
provider were permitted to try out its new approach. Second,
consumers may completely reject the change, in which case the
network making the change would lose customers to its competi-
tors until it once again returned to the fold. Third, the change
may appeal to some consumers, but not to others. As I have ar-
gued at length elsewhere, permitting this kind of diversification
can make it possible for smaller players to survive even if they
operate with fewer subscribers and higher costs. 2 51 In this way,
smaller players can use niche strategies to survive in much the
same way that boutiques survive in the face of competition with
low-cost discounters and full-line department stores. 252
The argument in favor of placing the burden of proof on
those opposing a particular practice is based on more than just
technological humility. There is a solid empirical foundation
supporting the inference that vertical restraints and other forms
of exclusivity tend to promote consumer welfare. For example, a
251 See Yoo, 19 Harv J L & Tech at 27-33 (cited in note 22) (showing how network
diversity can allow competitors to survive despite the presence of unexhausted economies
of scale).
252 See Wu and Yoo, 59 Fed Commun L J at 576 (cited in note 161) ("Employing
different protocols might also provide more competition among network platforms by
permitting multiple networks to survive by targeting subsegments of the overall market,
in much the same way that specialty stores survive in a world dominated by low-cost,
mass-market retailers.").
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recent study conducted by four members of the FTC's staff sur-
veying twenty-two published empirical studies found "a paucity
of support for the proposition that vertical restraints/vertical in-
tegration are likely to harm consumers. ' 253 Indeed, only one
study unambiguously found that vertical integration harmed
consumers, and "in this instance, the losses are miniscule ($0.60
per cable subscriber per year)." 25 4 On the other hand, "a far
greater number of studies found that the use of vertical re-
straints in the particular context studied improved welfare un-
ambiguously." 255 The survey thus concluded that "[m]ost studies
find evidence that vertical restraints/vertical integration are pro-
competitive." 256 The weight of the evidence thus "suggests that
vertical restraints are likely to be benign or welfare enhanc-
ing,"257 which in turn provides empirical support for placing the
burden on those opposing the practice.
Another survey published in the Handbook of Antitrust Eco-
nomics similarly reviewed twenty-three published empirical
studies of vertical restraints. Despite the relatively small sample
size, the authors found the empirical evidence to be "quite strik-
ing," "surprisingly consistent," "consistent and convincing," and
even "compelling."' 258 As a general matter, "privately imposed
vertical restraints benefit consumers or at least do not harm
them," while government mandates or prohibitions of vertical
restraints "systematically reduce consumer welfare or at least do
not improve it."259 Together "[t]he evidence ... supports the con-
clusion that in these markets, manufacturer and consumer in-
terests are apt to be aligned, while interference in the market [by
the government] is accomplished at the expense of consumers
(and of course manufacturers)." 260 The authors conclude that
"the empirical evidence suggests that in fact a relaxed antitrust
attitude towards [vertical] restraints may well be warranted."261
253 See James C. Cooper et al, Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23
Intl J Indus Org 639, 648 (2005).
254 Id at 648.
255 Id.
256 Id at 658.
257 Cooper, et al, 23 Intl J Indus Org at 662 (cited in note 253).
258 Francine Lafontaine and Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Re-
straints: Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in Paolo Buccirossi ed, Handbook of Anti-
trust Economics 392, 408-09 (MIT 2008).
259 Id at 408.
260 Id at 409.
261 Id.
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It is for this reason that I have long advocated an approach
that I call network diversity, which would permit network pro-
viders to experiment with various practices until such time as
those practices can be shown to harm competition. Enforcement
of this approach will occur through a case-by-case, ex post analy-
sis of the impact on competition, rather than through a categori-
cal, ex ante prohibition. 262 It would thus be a mistake to call my
approach deregulatory. 263 Instead, I believe it represents an im-
portant middle-ground between deregulation (that is, per se le-
gality) and ex ante, categorical prohibition (that is, per se illegal-
ity).
CONCLUSION
I began writing about network neutrality when there was a
fairly large consensus in favor of network neutrality and signifi-
cant momentum in Congress and the FCC toward enacting some
form of categorical prohibition against deviating from TCP/IP.
My arguments were offered as exemplifying theory to rebut those
calls. What is sometimes overlooked was that my arguments did
not go to the other extreme of calling for nonregulation. Instead,
I proposed a middle course that guarded against the possibility of
consumer harm while leaving ample room for experimentation.
The plausibility of the benefits from deviating from the status
quo convinces me that this is the appropriate course to follow at
this time. The internet is becoming more complex. The number of
users is expanding, and the variety of ways that they are using
the internet is expanding even faster. As the user base grows and
the industry matures, it is inevitable that networks will experi-
ment with different pricing regimes as well as services that op-
erate on principles other than TCP/IP. The FCC's experience in
overseeing access regimes also serves as a cautionary tale about
the likelihood of any attempt to regulate the terms and condi-
tions of access. 264 As a result, an ex post, case-by-case approach
remains the best way to promote investment in and competition
among last-mile networks while at the same time providing
meaningful protection against any demonstrated anticompetitive
262 See Yoo, 19 Harv J L & Tech at 75-76 (cited in note 22) (arguing in favor of an ex
post, case-by-case approach that places the burden of proof on the party opposing the
practice over ex ante, categorical prohibitions).
263 See note 40 and accompanying text.
264 Yoo, 19 Harv J L & Tech at 40-43 (cited in note 22) (detailing the difficulties the
FCC has faced in implementing other access regimes).
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harm that may arise.
